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In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law, 
Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHC~), sometimes referred to as the Education 
of the Handicapped Act (EHA) and changed by act of Congress 
to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) as of 
October 30, 1990. When Ford approved this law, he was 
enacting a descendent of a long line of legislative 
amendments which had evolved to guarantee handicapped 
children the right to a free and appropriate public 
education (FAPE). The EAHCA is easier understood, then, as 
the "Bill of Educational Rights" for the handicapped. 
Schimmel (1983) concluded, the question is no longer 
whether handicapped children have a right to an education, 
but rather, how their right to an "appropriate education" is 
to be defined (5). 
The implementation of this law has subsequently led 
to a myriad of state laws, court cases, judicial rulings, 
educational analyses, and major changes in the public 
schools of the United States, having special implications 
for school administrators who have been charged to provide 
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free and appropriate educations for the handicapped students 
they serve. 
Public school administrators of today face an ever-
increasing number of legal issues at the school site. The 
complexities of the EAHCA and its stipulated special 
education and related service requirements have become a 
dominant source of rapidly expanding litigation, which tends 
to divert already scarce financial resources from 
educational programs to legal expenses. It is important 
that school leaders know this law, communicate its intent, 
implement its provisions, and be effective in doing so in 
order to provide the most appropriate education to the 
handicapped and to avoid costly litigation, which in many 
instances, has led to monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and 
even loss of federal funding. 
The federal and California statutes which establish 
the educational rights of handicapped students, combined 
with current and sometimes conflicting court decisions, 
comprise a voluminous, complex, and difficult-to-understand 
body of law. Schimmel (1983) pointed out that 
since a specific definition of what constitutes a free 
appropriate public education is not included in the 
EAHCA, it has been left up to the courts to decide on a 
definition pertinent to each case. The definitions from 
cases have not been uniform (5). 
The difficult and human issues involved in the 
education of the handicapped are further complicated by two 
characteristics. First, the legal principles involved with 
education for the handicapped are relatively new. Most of 
this body of law has been established since 1975. Second, 
this body of law changes rapidly. In a 1981 study, the 
National Center for State Courts estimated that litigation 
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involving the rights of handicapped students comprised 35 to 
40 percent of all civil cases involving the rights of 
students filed since 1976 (Zirkel 1989, 20-21). 
Although major uncertainties continue to surround 
many aspects of legal compliance, test cases are fewer now 
than when the EABCA was first implemented. 
Not many organizations can sustain the expense of 
protracted court proceedings, and legal advocates are 
reluctant to initiate major class action suits in a 
political climate they perceive as increasingly hostile 
to broad interpretations of the law (Singer and Butler 
1987, 144). 
Even though their study is not to be perceived as a 
national study, Singer and Butler (1987, 144) suggested that 
in the five communities they studied, legal and 
administrative actions to enforce compliance have waned 
dramatically. According to Singer and Butler, a predictable 
advocacy cycle has been enacted: an initial flurry of 
activity, followed by institutionalization of the law, and 
then after ten years, the tendency among many groups to turn 
to other issues and priorities. In the implementation of 
the EABCA, there have been and continue to be issues and/or 
grievances which, even after being processed through 
administrative hearings that have well established 
precedence, fail to be resolved except through judicial rulings. 
Statement of the Problem 
Two common problems in the implementation of the 
EAHCA that have failed to be resolved except by the courts 
deal with disputes on appropriate special education 
placements, i.e., public versus private school and 
residential versus day school, and disputes on "medical 
service" limitations in the EAHCA related services 
definitions. Further, related to both issues, a major 
problem has arisen which is linked to the divergence of 
opinions of school administrators who must make 
educational/fiscal decisions under the EAHCA while 
attempting to morally and ethically comply with the 
philosophical and legal mandates of the EAHCA. 
Purpose of the Study 
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The purpose of this study was to clarify issues 
dealing specifically with implementing the stipulations of 
the EAHCA regarding appropriate special education placement 
and special education related services, in particular 
exempted medical services, especially in light of the 
stringent fiscal status in most public schools today. This 
study examines issues of operational special education and 
indirect costs faced by educational decision makers as they 
are confronted with fiscal, education, and legal variables 
in their attempts to comply with the EAHCA. The hidden 
costs are predominately those related to litigation. 
5 
This study provides an historical perspective on how 
handicapped education was implemented prior to 1975 and then 
subsequent to passage of P.L. 94-142 (the EAHCA) in 1975. 
The study focuses on definitions stipulated in federal 
statutes, especially those regarding placement and medical 
related services. Current California statutes and 
administrative regulations are reviewed, along with federal 
and state case law dealing with judicial findings and 
holdings regarding compliance with EAHCA placement and 
related service requirements. 
The total study, including the history of education 
for the handicapped, current operating procedures in 
California, and the most recent judicial findings and 
holdings, serves as the content basis for a staff 
development program in the Clovis Unified School District 
(hereafter referred to as Clovis Unified) for site 
principals, teachers, and special education managers. 
Methodology 
A legal case study of a recent Clovis Unified 
litigation, which focused on appropriate special education 
placement and related services, is the focal point for an 
examination of procedural steps required by the EAHCA of 
parents and school district officials in order to be in 
compliance with not only the EAHCA, but also the growing 
body of federal and state judicial holdings with regard to 
education for the handicapped. First, the case cited 
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demonstrates the due process procedures existent for the 
protection of handicapped students, their parents, and the 
educational institutions responsible for providing a FAPE. 
Second, the case illustrates the administrative hearings and 
judicial appeals available to the handicapped students and 
the responsible school district. Third, the case cited 
illustrates the evolving nature of judicial interpretations 
in the implementation of the EAHCA and the effects of such 
rulings on educational decision makers. 
Case Study: Michelle S. 
The methodology used in this study was the 
examination of a legal case recently litigated in the u.s. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Clovis Unified 
School District--Appellant v. California Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Michelle s., Real Party in 
Interest--Appellee (1990, 4811-17). 
The nature of the case presents the question of 
whether schools must pay for the private psychiatric 
hospitalization of a handicapped child under the "related 
services" definitions of P.L. 94-142. In this case the u.s. 
District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled 
that Clovis Unified must pay for medical costs, the 
hospitalization of Michelle. Clovis Unified appealed that 
decision on the grounds that the district court ignored 
pertinent state special education policies, procedures, and 
laws that the state developed to ensure a free and 
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appropriate education to all handicapped children within its 
jurisdiction, and that the district court's rulings placed 
an unwarranted obligation to pay for hospitalization on 
Clovis Unified that Congress did not intend. 
Generally, the facts were not disputed and are 
briefly recited as follows. Michelle S. was a ten-year-old 
girl who was seriously emotionally disturbed and was 
entitled to special education and related services. Both 
Michelle's parents and Clovis Unified stipulated that she 
was in need of residential placement in order to receive an 
appropriate education. 
Michelle S. was born in 1977 and adopted in 1981. 
In 1982, at age five, she exhibited severe emotional 
disturbances in the public schools of the state of 
Washington. She was hospitalized for two months for 
emotional difficulties in late 1983. 
In June 1984, Michelle s. and her family moved to 
Riverside, California, where she was placed in a mental 
health day treatment center because of her tantrums and 
destructive behavior. From there she was placed in a mental 
health residential treatment program. This program offered 
a special education day class which included a full 
instructional day. In this program, Michelle S. performed 
at grade level. 
In January 1985, Michelle S.'s parents moved to 
Fresno while Michelle S. remained in Riverside. Michelle s. 
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continued to perform adequately in her special education day 
class; however, her emotional condition deteriorated. In 
March 1985, the Riverside Mental Health Residential 
Treatment Program gave notice that it could no longer meet 
the needs of Michelle S. and recommended that she be placed 
in a licensed acute care facility. In mid-March 1985, 
King's View Hospital, a licensed acute care psychiatric 
hospital located in Reedley, a rural community near Fresno, 
accepted Michelle S. The Kings Canyon Unified School 
District became the educational agency responsible for the 
special educational program for Michelle s. Kings View 
Hospital is located within that district's boundaries. 
Kings Canyon Unified's educational expenses were borne by 
Clovis Unified, as mandated by state procedures, based on 
the parents' residence in the Clovis Unified School 
District. 
It must be noted that Michelle S.'s parents 
unilaterally placed Michelle S. at Kings View because of the 
acute psychological care she required. The residential/ 
medical fees were paid by the parents' medical insurance. 
In July 1985, the parents' medical insurance ran out. 
In July 1985, Michelle S.'s parents notified Clovis 
Unified that they wanted Clovis Unified to pay for the 
residential costs of Michelle S.'s placement at Kings View 
Hospital because their domicile was within the attendance 
boundaries of the Clovis Unified School District. 
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The parents of Michelle S. and Clovis Unified 
administrators met and discussed alternative placements. 
Clovis Unified first recommended a State Diagnostic School, 
a temporary residential placement located in Fresno, which 
could provide additional evaluation information on 
Michelle's educational needs. A second recommendation was 
Re-Ed West, a residential school located in Sacramento, 
California, which provides an intensive educational program 
for severely emotionally disturbed children, including a 
six-hour-a-day instructional program coordinated with a 
counseling and residential program. When no alternative 
placement was agreed to by the parents, they filed for an 
administrative hearing requesting placement at Kings View at 
the expense of Clovis Unified. 
After the administrative hearing was held, the 
independent hearing officer ruled that Michelle s. should be 
placed at Kings View for the 1985-86 school year (Civil No. 
CV~F-479 E.D.D., U.S. Dist. Crt., Eastern District of 
California). In September 1985, Clovis Unified filed for a 
temporary restraining order in the u.s. District Court; the 
motion was denied. 
Clovis Unified, with the assistance of the State 
Department of Education, sought a trial date in October 
1985. A date was set, then postponed until March 1986. 
An interesting and further complicating factor was 
introduced into the Michelle S. case when Kings View 
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Hospital was found to have strong affiliations with the 
Mennonite Church and that pastoral assessments and 
counseling were part of the overall treatment program. 
Since state law does not allow for the certification of 
sectarian nonpublic schools and agencies, the State 
Department of Education withdrew Kings View's certification 
(California, Education Code 1980, 56365 et. seq.). When 
Clovis Unified tried to add the issue of the sectarian 
status of Kings View as an amended complaint for the March 
1986 trial date, the district court denied the amended 
complaint addition. 
The trial was held, and in June and July 1986, the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered by the 
district court, as was a judgment for Michelle S. 
The district court's denial of motions for a new 
trial and amendments for Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law led Clovis Unified to file an appeal with the u.s. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The final district 
court action was to grant a stay of execution judgment in 
December 1986. 
Limitations 
This study is limited to presenting, discussing, 
analyzing, and considering the law dealing specifically with 
appropriate special education placements and special 
education-related services, especially the medical services 
limitation statement in P.L. 94-142. An examination and 
11 
consideration of special education costs that the Congress 
and subsequent judicial interpretations meant to include and 
exclude under the law are also presented. 
The issues present in the Michelle S. case lead to 
the following questions, which this study analyzes. 
1. Must public school districts pay under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EAHCA) for the costs of 
psychiatric hospitalization for severely emotionally 
disturbed patients of school age? 
2. May a district court order a public education 
agency to pay more than is necessary to confer some 
education benefit? 
3. May a district court ignore a state's special 
education delivery system and a state's standards for 
educating handicapped children in nonpublic residential 
facilities? 
4. May a district court refuse to consider the 
comparative costs for residential placements and for 
hospitalization? 
5. May a district court ignore the sectarian nature 
of nonpublic residential or psychiatric hospitalization? 
The formal answers to these questions were 
ultimately provided by the Ninth Circuit Court, but the 
intent of P.L. 94-142 and legal precedence in similar 
district court, appellate court, and landmark u.s. Supreme 
Court decisions indicated that it would have been a complete 
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departure from the evolving interpretation of special 
education case law regarding appropriate special education 
placement-related services, and costs of special education. 
This study also presents a summary of litigation 
costs required to take such a case as Michelle S. to trial 
and through appeals for final resolution. The intent in 
doing so is to inform and/or remind public school 
administrators of the potential financial resource drain 
inherent in not understanding or implementing the law as 
Congress intended or as legal interpretation precedence 
leads. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Historical Perspective 
The early history of the handicapped is primarily an 
unpleasant story of misunderstanding and mistreatment based 
on fear and superstition. According to Gearhart (1980), the 
pre-Christian era was marked with the common practices of 
abandonment or death for young children who were "defective" 
(26). While periodic attempts to improve the lot of the 
handicapped occurred, this variable treatment of the 
handicapped continued for centuries, until the late 1700s. 
Special Schools: Institutionalization 
In the early 1800s a permanent change for the better 
was initiated. Special schools were established to serve 
the deaf, the blind, the mentally retarded, and to a limited 
extent, the mentally ill. Throughout the 1880s, institutions 
for the handicapped were established in Europe and the 
United States. The institutional setting seemed to be the 
logical place for the handicapped, with a few individuals 
returning to mainstream society, but with most remaining 
institutionalized for life. 
Lilly (1979), in examining historical and 
traditional perspectives of handicapped education, pointed 
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out that a link between intelligence measurement and the 
pervasive effects of intelligence on many aspects of social 
behavior caused treatment and control systems to be 
established that stressed separation of the handicapped from 
the normal population. This tendency, he claimed, was 
difficult to overcome. "It is difficult to maintain that 
the early 1900's was a pleasant time to live for a person 
with low measured intelligence or a handicapping condition" 
(Lilly 1979, 6). 
Exclusionary Doctrine 
An historical assessment of the educational rights 
of handicapped children prior to 1970 also provides a mixed 
picture of some supportive state legislative mandates and an 
entrenched exclusionary legal doctrine created by state 
lawmakers and supported by various levels of the judiciary 
(Data Research, Inc. 1987, 1). 
Pruitt (1983, 1) found that New Jersey in 1911, New 
York in 1917, and Massachusetts in 1920 had produced 
legislative mandates addressing the needs of the 
handicapped. These generally were permissive in nature and 
interpreted as so by local school districts. 
In contrast, the exclusionary legal doctrine 
established by state lawmakers and judiciaries supported a 
general public view that many handicapped children should 
not be educated in the public schools. Many handicapped 
students were generally denied access to public schools 
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under state laws which excused them from compulsory 
attendance and removed from public school officials any 
legal duty to grant them the same access that nonhandicapped 
students enjoyed (Johnson 1986, 1). These laws expressed 
society's belief that handicapped children could not benefit 
from education and that their presence in the public schools 
would have an adverse effect on the welfare of other 
students. 
For example, Alaskan law excluded children with 
"bodily or mental conditions rendering attendance 
inadvisable" (Alaska 1971, Statutes, Title 14, chap. 30). 
Nevada's law allowed exclusion when the child's "physical or 
mental condition or attitude (was] such as to prevent or 
render inadvisable his attendance at school or his 
application to study" (Nevada 1963, Revised Statutes, sec. 
392.050). Virginia's compulsory attendance statute included 
an exemption for "children physically or mentally 
incapacitated for school work" (Code of Virginia 1973, sec. 
22.275.3). 
Earlier judicial reviews found the courts permissive 
and supportive of the legal doctrine of exclusion from 
public education of the handicapped. In 1893, a 
Massachusetts court affirmed a school committee's exclusion 
of a handicapped child because he was "so weak in mind as 
not to derive any marked benefit from instruction and 
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further, that he [was] so troublesome to other children" 
(Watson v. City of Cambridge 1863, 864). 
His physical condition and ailment produces a depressing 
and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school 
children, • • • he takes up an undue portion of the 
teacher's time and attention, distracts attention of 
other pupils, and interferes generally with the 
discipline and progress of the school (Beattie v. Board 
of Education of City of Antigo 1919, 153-54). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the boy had a 
constitutional right to attend public school. The court 
held, however, that the school board had the legal authority 
and, in this ca~e, the duty to exclude the boy. 
Special Classes 
Gearhart (1980, 26) explained that as the twentieth 
century dawned, a new point of view was adopted regarding 
the proper physical setting for the education of the 
handicapped. It was proposed that, rather than sending 
handicapped children to separate schools or institutions, 
they should be provided special classes within the public 
schools. This special class concept became the accepted 
service mode until the mid-1960s. 
Growth of Categories Served 
Other significant changes that were happening 
included the growth of categories of handicaps that were 
being serviced in these special classes in public schools. 
In the 1930s one new area of handicapped education that came 
into its own was public school education of children with 
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"mild emotional disturbances" or behavior disorders. Until 
this time, programs for the emotionallly disturbed had been 
primarily residential. Treatment had been largely 
psychiatric in nature, and the residential centers for the 
emotionally disturbed had tended toward segregation, 
depersonalization, and often cruel custodial care. The 
increased demands on school-based services resulted in a 
large number of special classes for children who were judged 
as too disruptive for the regular classroom setting (Lilly 
1979, 6). 
Least Restrictive Environment 
During the 1960s and increasingly in the 1970s, the 
concept of mainstreaming, or return to the least restrictive 
environment, became popular. A similar movement paralleled 
the mainstreaming concept in public schools, and that was 
the "normalization" process of the institutionalized. 
Basically, the movement was deinstitutionalization and 
return to the home community whenever possible (Gearhart 
1980, 26). 
Gearhart (1980, 27) explained that while 
"mainstreaming" and "normalization" were general trends, 
there was also a movement toward more services for more of 
the handicapped population, all provided at public expense. 
Promoted primarily by advocacy organizations of parents and 
professional special education associations, this increase 
in service was stimulated further by litigation which 
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spotlighted denial of equal rights to the handicapped and by 
legislation that made it mandatory for public agencies to 
serve the handicapped. 
Mandated Services 
This significant increase in the scope of the 
mandated services to be provided, coupled with a different 
frame of reference for the provision of these services, 
i.e., special classes, increasing interest in special 
education, and increasing litigation, was the status quo at 
the start of 1975. The end of an era was at hand. 
This dawn of a new era and a different frame of 
reference was the same issue addressed by Schimmel (1983, 1) 
in his study of the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975 (EAHCA). 
In 1966, an ad hoc subcommittee on the Education and 
Labor Committee of the House of Representatives turned its 
attention to the needs of the handicapped and detailed the 
need for support of the education of handicapped children: 
The Subcommittee reported that only abut one-third of 
the approximately 5.5 million handicapped children were 
being provided an appropriate special education. The 
remaining two-thirds were either totally excluded from 
schools or sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting 
the time when they were old enough to "drop out." The 
Subcommittee also learn that Federal programs directed 
at handicapped children were minimal, fractionated, 
uncoordinated, and frequently given a low priority in 
the education community (U.S. Congress, House 1975, 2). 
ESEA Amendments of 1966 
On the basis of this information, Congress 
reorganized the inadequate educational opportunities for 
handicapped children by enacting the Elementary and 
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Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Amendments of 1966. Congress 
provided a new Title VI, which began a program of grants to 
states in order to assist states in the education of 
handicapped children (Pruitt 1983, 2). Congress also 
created a National Advisory Committee on Handicapped 
Children and a Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in 
the u.s. Department of Education (Schimmel 1983, 2). Title 
VI was repealed in 1971 and replaced with the ESEA 
Amendments of 1970. Under these amendments, a separate act 
was created, entitled the Education of the Handicapped Act 
of 1970 (Pruitt 1983, 2). 
Congress remained active in introducing legislation 
supportive of education for the handicapped throughout the 
early 1970s. In 1974, P.L. 93-380 (ESEA Amendments of 1974) 
was signed into law (Pruitt 1983, 2). According to the 
Senate committee, 
this legislation was originally introduced as Senate 
3614 on May 16, 1972. It followed a series of landmark 
court cases establishing in law the right to education 
for all handicapped children. Since those initial 
decisions in 1971 and 1972 and with similar decisions in 
27 states, it is clear today that this "right to 
education" is no longer in question (U.S. Congress, 
Senate 1975, 6). 
By 1971, thirty-three states had adopted supportive 
legislation for the handicapped, and by 1975, most states 
had some form of mandatory legislation regarding the 
handicapped, but such legislation carried little or no 
enforcement mechanism (Pruitt 1983, 1). 
Brown v. Board of Education 
Congressional and judicial recognition of the 
education rights of the handicapped has relied heavily on 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954). In Brown, the United 
States Supreme Court established the right to equal 
education by stating that equal opportunity for education 
and the protection of law could not result in separate but 
equal schools. The court emphasized the importance of 
education in American society: 
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Education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities •••• It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment. For these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity to an 
education (Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 483, 493). 
Two judicial decisions which may have started the 
process that led to the adoption by Congress of the EAHCA of 
1975 were PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1971, a 
suit on behalf of retarded students decided by a U.S. 
district court in Pennsylvania, and Mills v. Board of 
Education, a 1972 decision in favor of all students excluded 
from access to a public education in the District of 
Columbia. 
PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
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The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children 
(PARC) brought a class action suit on behalf of all retarded 
students between the ages of six and twenty-one who were 
being excluded from public education by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. The goal of the suit was to establish the 
legal right of the retarded for access to a public 
education. Lawyer T. K. Gilhool argued violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal and Protection and Due Process 
Clauses and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Constitution 
because it promised a public education for all children 
(PARC v. Pennsylvania 1972, 279). The district court did 
not have to render a decision because a Consent Agreement 
was drafted by the Pennsylvania attorney general that 
allowed placement of each mentally retarded student in a 
free public program of education and training appropriate to 
the student's capacity. Basically, the Consent Agreement 
allowed for the following: identification of mentally 
regarded students, provisions for educational services, 
parental notification, hearings with parents when 
educational placement was being changed, explanation of all 
procedures to parents, parental access to all student 
records, and parental review of appropriateness of an 
educational program. These provisions are the basic 
underpinnings for current federal criteria in providing a 
FAPE. 
Mills v. Board of Education 
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In the District of Columbia, seven students who were 
retarded and who were excluded from public schools sued for 
their own rights and the rights of similar students who were 
being excluded from access to public education. The 
District of Columbia school district board admitted 
responsibility, but claimed insufficient funds to provide 
education to all handicapped children. Only 3,880 of 18,000 
identified mentally retarded students in the district were 
being served (Mills v. Board of Education 1972, 887-83). 
The u.s. district court ruled summarily for the 
plaintiffs in 1972. The District of Columbia was violating 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the u.s. 
Constitution by denying handicapped children access to 
public education while providing it to others. The 
resulting mandated program required the District of Columbia 
to locate (identify), to provide constitutionally adequate 
prior due process hearings on placement, to ensure periodic 
reviews of status and progress, and finally, to provide 
access to public education for all handicapped children, not 
just the mentally retarded (Mills v. Board of Education 
1972, 877-83). 
These two decisions opened public schools to all 
handicapped children. The subsequent requirements led to 
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greatly expanded special education programs, and sharp 
increases in school budgets. Advocates for the handicapped 
and various state education department officials turned to 
the Congress of the United States to find some of the money 
needed to meet the increased number of special education 
needs. 
Congress responded to the need for more federal 
money to aid states in educating handicapped students. 
Specifically, they passed new grant programs and laws 
intended to guarantee legal rights for handicapped students. 
These laws--the Rehabilitation Act of 1975 (sec. 504) and 
P.L. 94-142 (EABCA)--imposed on public schools of every 
state comprehensive legal responsibilities for education for 
the handicapped. These two laws are the basis for hundreds 
·Of federal and state court decisions regarding the education 
of the handicapped (Johnson 1986, 5). 
The PARC and Mills cases greatly increased the 
pressure on Congress to spend even more federal money on 
state public school programs for handicapped children. 
Based on the results of those two litigations and similar 
cases in other states, Congress enacted two federal laws 
that have established the legal basis for states in 
providing every handicapped child with an appropriate 
education at public expense. 
These two laws--the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(sec. 504) and P.L. 94-142 (EABCA)--are both based on 
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Congress's power to spend federal money for the general 
welfare and to regulate the way states use the federal funds 
they receive. Congress lacks constitutional power to 
regulate directly the public schools of the fifty states, 
but it has discovered that its legislative intent can be 
enforced by ensuring that federal funds are used to promote 
the general welfare or equal opportunity and protection 
under the law. 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 
Section 504 is not a federal grant program; it 
provides no money to aid handicapped persons. It does 
impose a duty on every recipient of federal funds not to 
discriminate against handicapped persons. The Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) serves as the enforcement agency of the 
act. The OCR generally investigates complaints that allege 
violations of Section 504. The procedures of investigation 
are called "compliance reviews." The Section 504 issues 
that have most often attracted the OCR's education of 
handicapped interest include the following: locating and 
identifying handicapped children, notifying parents of 
rights and services available, proving program accessibility 
to students with orthopedic and sensory impairments, and 
making educational placements and changes in placements of 
handicapped children. The OCR provides written reports of 
its complaint investigations and its compliance reviews. 
The agency's view of the requirements of the law are 
published in a specialized law reporter entitled Education 
for the Handicapped Law Report (EHLR). 
Congress did not explicitly provide Section 504 a 
judicial enforcement through a "private right of action." 
However, various Supreme Court decisions have held that 
persons may sue to enforce their rights under Section 504. 
In Smith v. Robinson, the court held that a plaintiff may 
not use Section 504 to circumvent the extensive 
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administrative procedures required by the EAHCA if the suit 
concerns the child's right to a free appropriate education 
(Smith v. Robinson 1984, 3457). 
The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 (EAHCA) is a federal grant program that provides 
substantial sums of federal money to states and local school 
districts to pay part of the cost of educating handicapped 
students in elementary and secondary schools. The EAHCA 
(P.L. 94-142) is an unusually detailed statute that sets 
forth a specific, complex, and comprehensive design that 
states must follow to qualify for the federal funds that the 
law authorizes. P.L. 94-142 requires that states have a 
policy assuring a free appropriate education to all 
handicapped children, effective september 1, 1978. The 
state's policy must provide expanded due process rights for 
26 
parents and children, including the right to appeal 
disagreements to an independent hearing officer, and the 
state policy must provide the right to sue. A state, 
further, must guarantee the development of an individualized 
education plan (IEP) to guide each handicapped student's 
education (Johnson 1986, 12). 
The EAHCA (P.L. 94-142) is administratively enforced 
by the Office of Special Education Programs in the U.S. 
Department of Education's Office of Special Education and 
Rehabilitation Services. Coordinated writing of Section 504 
and EAHCA regulations and a memorandum of understanding 
between the OCR and the Office of Special Education Programs 
have done much to achieve effective, efficient, and 
consistent application of the two enforcement agencies. In 
the EAHCA, Congress explicitly provided for parents to file 
individual law suits, if necessary, to gain free appropriate 
education for a handicapped child. Congress also required 
parents to complete specific administrative appeal processes 
before seeking judicial intervention. 
The heart of P.L. 94-142 is revealed in its purpose 
statement (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1400 (c)). In essence, this act 
mandates that states are to seek out, identify, and 
guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to 
every handicapped child. 
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FAPE Definition 
The specific definition of a FAPE is as follows: 
The term "free appropriate public education" means 
special education and related services which (a) have 
been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge, (b) meet 
the standards of the State education agency, (c) include 
an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
education in the State involved, and (d) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program 
(IEP) required under section 1414 (a) (5) of this title 
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (18)). 
This FAPE is intended to allow the nation's 
handicapped citizens to have full equality of opportunity, 
where before as many as half of the nation's handicapped 
were not receiving appropriate educational services. The 
act also states that it is in the national interest that the 
federal government assist state and local efforts to provide 
programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped 
children in order to assure equal protection of the law 
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1400 (b)). 
Handicapped Children Definition 
The act has made very clear who the clientele are to 
be as it defines handicapped children as follows: 
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded, 
hard of hearing, deaf, speech or emotionally disturbed, 
orthopedically impaired, visually handicapped, seriously 
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other 
health impaired children, or children with specific 
learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require 
special education and related services (EAHCA 1980, sec. 
1401 (a)(1)). 
Specific Learning Disabilities 
Definition 
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To clarify even further the phrase regarding 
specific learning disabilities in the previous paragraph, a 
definition has been further delineated in the act: 
The term "children with specific learning disabilities" 
means those children who have a disorder in one or more 
of the basic psychological processes involved in 
understanding or in using language, spoken or written, 
which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability 
to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do 
mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such 
conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, 
minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental 
aphasia. Such term does not include children who have 
learning problems which are primarily the result of 
visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental 
retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of 
environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage (EAHCA 
1980, sec. 1401 (a) (15)). 
Special Education Definition 
In setting out its goal for a FAPE for all 
handicapped children, Congress has also been very specific 
in describing the process in how this goal was to be 
achieved. The act clearly stated that a FAPE consists of 
special education and related services. The act defines 
special education as follows: 
The term "special education" means specially designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet 
the unique needs of a handicapped child, including 
classroom instruction, instruction in physical 
education, home instruction, and instruction in 
hospitals and institutions (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) 
( 16) ) • 
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Related Services Definition 
Related services were also clearly stipulated. 
The term "related services" means transportation, and 
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive 
services (including speech pathology and audiology, 
psychological services, physical and occupational 
therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling 
services, except that such medical services shall be for 
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be 
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from 
special education, and includes the early identification 
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children 
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (o) (17)). 
On August 5, 1986, President Reagan signed into law 
s. 415, the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 
the so-called Attorney's Fees Bill. The urgency law 
reversed the u.s. Supreme Court Smith v. Robinson decision 
of July 5, 1984, and authorized courts to award reasonable 
fees to parents who, after having exhausted administrative 
procedures, prevailed in EAHCA civil court actions or 
administrative due process proceedings. This new public 
law, P.L. 99-372, protected children's rights to a free 
appropriate public education. The law was to be retroactive 
to all cases pending as of July 3, 1984, or decided between 
July 4, 1984, and August 5, 1984. The law also allowed 
filing of civil actions under laws other than P.L. 94-142, 
ao long as parents first exhausted administrative remedies 
ttnder P.L. 94-142 (Hinkle 1986, 3). 
The provisions of P.L. 99-372 were included in the 
BAHCA in sees. 1415 (e) (4) and 1415 (f). The EAHCA (EHA) 
was retitled on October 30, 1990, to become the Individuals 
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with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (Data Research, 1991, 
295). 
California Historical Handicapped 
Education 
The California development of special programs for 
the education of the handicapped had its origins in private 
charitable efforts and has moved steadily to the present era 
of public school responsibility. The evaluation of services 
matches in many ways the growth of handicapped education as 
depicted for the nation by Gearhart (1980) and Lilly (1979). 
Special Schools and 
Classes 
Special education in California began in 1860 when, 
by the authorization of the legislature, a residential 
school for the deaf was established in San Francisco (State 
of California, Department of Finance 1977, 1). In 1865, 
funds were authorized for a combined school for the blind 
and deaf, and such a school was established in Berkeley. 
The city of Los Angeles pioneered speech classes in the 
public school program in 1897, by opening a public day class 
for deaf children. Within the next three years, similar 





In 1907, a law was passed making it permissible for 
school districts to establish visual systems of instruction 
for deaf pupils. During the next ten years, special 
education classes for deaf, hard of hearing, blind, and 
speech handicapped were instituted in several of the larger 
school districts in the state. By 1921, school districts 
were given authority to establish special classes for 
mentally retarded students (State of California, Assembly 
1965, 14). The permissive authorization was not enough 
impetus for most districts. 
Day Classes Versus 
Residential Schools 
Experiences with special education for handicapped 
children during the first quarter of this century seemed to 
demonstrate that such children could be more successfully 
educated in day classes than in residential schools. In 
addition, cost was considerably less. Parents began to 
demand extended school facilities for their disabled 
youngsters, and such private organizations as the California 
Society for Crippled Children and the American Hearing 
Society began to press for legislative provisions that would 
give additional financial support to school districts to 
help defray the cost of educating the handicapped. 
In 1927, the California Legislature enacted laws 
allowing reimbursement to school districts for the excess 
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costs of educating the handicapped. From the beginning, 
school districts had not seen education of such children as 
their duty; the districts had tended to think of it as a 
state responsibility, to be shouldered by themselves only 
with state financing. As the state began to identify and 
provide services to more educationally handicapped children, 
the County Offices of Education became the prime coordinator 
of such programs; a fact which is still evident today. The 
1927 laws provided that governing boards might offer 
education suitable to the needs of the blind, deaf, hard of 
hearing, crippled, and such other physically handicapped 
individuals as the superintendent of public instruction 
might designate. The cost to local districts would be 
reimbursed by half the actual excess expense, not to exceed 
$100 per unit of average daily attendance (State of 
California, Assembly 1965, 14). 
During the next twenty years only minor changes were 
made in financing the various programs for handicapped 
students. Two of the changes were increasing excess cost to 
the total amount spent for remedial and individual 
instruction of physically handicapped pupils, and 
designating a minimum day of attendance as 240 minutes. 
By 1940, the Education Code contained authorization 
for the establishment of special education programs for all 
types of physically handicapped pupils and for the mentally 
retarded, and additionally, the state of California was 
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reimbursing local districts for part of the excess costs; 
however, relatively few school districts established classes 
for the handicapped. 
At the same time, private agencies interested in the 
handicapped began to champion the cause of better education 
for California's youth, whether handicapped or not. With 
education costs rising, school administrators were reluctant 
to establish new and expensive school programs and contended 
that greater state subsidies were the answer to education 
for the exceptional. 
Interested lay groups persisted in their efforts 
until 1945, when the California Senate appointed an interim 
committee to study mental deficiency. In this same year a 
new group of physically impaired children were brought into 
the school program, namely, the cerebral palsied. Not only 
were excess costs reimbursed to school districts for the 
education of the cerebral palsied, but residential schools 
were also established (State of California, Assembly 1965, 
15) • 
In 1947, the California State Department of 
Education established the Bureau of Special Education. This 
bureau together with more laws began to accomplish the 
following: made it mandatory for school districts to provide 
or contract for educational facilities for physically 
handicapped children, increased the reimbursement for excess 
expenses in educating the physically handicapped, 
established County School Service Funds to provide for the 
physically handicapped who otherwise would not receive an 
education, made it permissible for physically handicapped 
children to enter special day classes at age three, and 
finally, made it mandatory for schools to establish and 
maintain special training classes for mentally retarded 
minors. 
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Moreover, funds were made available to reimburse 
districts for up to 75 percent of excess costs for educating 
the mentally retarded. A quarter of a million dollars was 
also provided to assist local schools and districts to 
construct special classes for the cerebral palsied. A 
special appropriation was made for San Francisco State 
College to develop a teacher education program in all fields 
of exceptionality. 
Mandatory Programs 
The enactment of the mandatory laws created 
additional problems for public school administrators, whose 
responsibilities were already being increased by a 
tremendous growth in school enrollment due to the population 
influx, but the added state support for the education of the 
handicapped was of considerable assistance. Special class 
programs for both physically and mentally handicapped 
students began to show a decided increase. State excess 
cost reimbursements for special programs operating during 
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the 1947-48 school year rose to new heights and reflected an 
increase in the number of handicapped pupils being served. 
The four years between 1947 and 1951 showed even 
greater activity in special education. Thousands of 
mentally and physically handicapped pupils were provided 
for, and the amount of state funds expended for the program 
doubled. 
The period from 1953 to 1963 brought additional 
expansion of special education programs, and increased state 
reimbursement. In 1963, a major change in California's 
system of special education came when the legislature 
authorized school districts to establish programs for the 
educationally handicapped. These programs were originally 
intended for students who were at least two years behind 
their school work and for students with severe behavioral 
problems, but were later expanded to include children with 
severe emotional disturbances (California Legislative 
Analyst 1968, 10). 
The range of programs existing by 1965 was described 
as follows: regular day classes and remedial classes. Both 
types were specially reimbursable. For more specialized 
services, there were resource classes, special day classes, 
separate public schools, individual instruction at home or 
in a hospital, schools and/or classes in institutions or 
sanitariums, and residential schools. The state also 
eventually enumerated fifteen special groups to be served by 
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the programs listed above: trainable retarded, educable 
retarded, blind, partially sighted, deaf, hard of hearing, 
speech defective, aphasic, cerebral palsied, orthopedically 
handicapped, those with lowered organic vitality, those with 
other illnesses and physical conditions, educationally 
handicapped, gifted, and culturally disadvantaged (State of 
California, Assembly 1965, 18). 
In 1965, the legislature authorized county 
superintendents of schools to establish Development Centers 
for Handicapped Minors as continuing programs. These 
centers were designed for severely mentally retarded, 
physically handicapped, and multihandicapped children who, 
without such programs, would have been either 
institutionalized or without educational programs 
altogether. A principal purpose of such programs was to 
relieve parents from the constant care of such children so 
that they could seek employment (State of California, 
Department of Finance 1977, 2). 
Part 30 of the Education Code was rewritten in 1980, 
primarily by Senate Bill 1870 (Rodda) (Chapter 797), and 
became law on July 28, 1980. This legislation repealed all 
former special education categorical programs and the Master 
Plan for Special Education program Education Code sections 
that were in effect on January 1, 1980. The legislation 
also restructured and added code sections implementing the 
Master Plan for Special Education statewide. Since the 
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passage of S.B. 1870, eighty-three legislative measures have 
modified California's special education statutes. 
Paul Hinkle, special education consultant for the 
Special Education Division of the California Department of 
Education, has published sixteen consecutive issues of 
California Special Education Programs: A Composite of Laws. 
Each year Education Code-Part 30 is revised with new laws 
enacted since the previous printed year. Additionally, this 
publication has grown to include other special education-
related laws, e.g., the California Code of Regulations, 
Title 5, and Special Education pertinent references in the 
Health and Safety and Welfare and Institutions Codes. Since 
the passage of S.B. 1870, eighty-three legislative measures 
have modified California's special education statutes 
(Hinkle 1994, iii). 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE 
A computerized legal search was conducted using 
WESTLAW-BASIC services. Queries were formulated using Title 
20 of the U.S. Code, sec. 1400, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), and the following were the 
specific locator terms: "related services," "medical 
services," and "hospitalization." The queries with the 
indicators listed above were computer searched in the 
ALLFEDS database, or the combined federal cases, including 
cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of 
appeal, and U.S. district courts dealing with these 
parameters. The resulting citation listing provided thirty-
seven cases that had relevant or parallel issues regarding 
hospital placement as necessary related services to provide 
special education (see Table 1). The time span covered in 
the ALLFEDS search provided cases from 1978 to 1987. 
Subsequent review of federal case law after 1987 has 
provided additional cases that have relevant or parallel 
issues and are as recent as the early 1990s. 
A similar search was done using WESTLAW-BASIC 
computer services with queries for California Supreme Court 
and courts of appeal case law. The resultant citations 
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Table 1. ALLFEDS Citations from Computerized Legal Search 
(WESTLAW-BASIC) Locator Terms: Related Services, 
Medical Services, and Hospitalization 
Citations 
1. U.S. 1984. Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 
104 s.ct. 3371. 
2. U.S.N.Y. 1982. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson 
Central School Dist. Bd. of Westchester County v. 
Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034. 
3. C.A.Ill. 1985. Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397. 
4. C.A.D.C. 1984. Lunceford v. District of Columbia Bd. 
of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577. 
5. C.A.Pa. 1981. Takarcik v. Forest Bills School Dist., 
665 F.2d 443. 
6. C.A.Del. 1981. Kruelle v. New Castle County School 
Dist., 642 F.2d 687. 
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7. C.A.Tex. 1980. Tatro v. State of Texas, 625 F.2d 557. 
8. C.A.N.Y. 1980. Rowley v. Board of Ed. of Hendrick 
Hudson Central School Dist., 632 F.2d 945. 
9. C.A.Pa. 1980. Battle v. Com. of Pa., 629 F.2d 269. 
10. S.D.Ohio 1987. McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F.Supp. 1361. 
11. D.D.N.Y. 1987. Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F.Supp. 
1015. 
12. W.D.Pa. 1987. Bevin B. by Michael B. v. Wright, 666 
F.Supp. 71. 
13. W.D.N.Y. 1987. Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653 
F.Supp. 1405. 
14. D.Mass. 1987. Doe v. Anrig, 651 F.Supp. 424. 
15. W.D.N.Y. 1986. Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 638 
F.Supp. 1564. 
16. N.D.N.Y. 1986. Detsel by Detsel v. Board of Educ. of 
Auburn Enlarged City School Dist., 637 F.Supp. 1022. 
Table 1 (continued) 
Citations 
17. D.C.N.Y. 1985. Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 621 
F.Supp. 975. 
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18. D.C.Mass. 1985. Com. of Mass. v. Heckler, 616 F.Supp. 
687. 
19. D.C.Tenn. 1985. Seals v. Loftis, 614 F.Supp. 302. 
20. D.C.Ill. 1984. Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F.Supp. 1437. 
21. D.C.N.J. 1983. T.G. on Behalf of D.G. v. Board of 
Educ. of Piscataway, N.J., 576 F.Supp. 420. 
22. D.C.Ill. 1983. Darlene L. v. Illinois State Bd. of 
Educ., 568 F.Supp. 1340. 
23. D.C.D.C. 1983. McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F.Supp. 404. 
24. D.C.Mo. 1983. Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. 
Louis County, 558 F.Supp. 545. 
25. D.C.Tex. 1982. Stacey G. by William and Jane G. v. 
Pasadena Independent School Dist., 547 F.Supp. 61. 
26. D.C.Cal. 1982. Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unif. 
School Dist., 553 F.Supp. 1107. 
27. D.C.Ill. 1982. WilliamS. v. Gill, 536 F.Supp. 505. 
28. D.C.Ill. 1980. Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F.Supp. 102. 
29. D.C.Ill. 1982. Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F.Supp. 296. 
30. D.C.Tex. 1982. Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Independent 
School Dist., 532 F.Supp. 460. 
31. D.C.Tex. 1981. Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent 
School Dist., 520 F.Supp. 869. 
32. D.C.Tex. 1981. Tatro v. State of Tex., 516 F.Supp. 
968. 
33. D.C.Conn. 1981. Papacoda v. State of Connecticut, 528 
F.Supp. 68. 
Table 1 (continued) 
Citations 
34. D.C.Colo. 1981. Association for Retarded Citizens in 
Colorado v. Frazier, 517 F.Supp. 105. 
35. D.C.Va. 1981. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F.Supp. 107. 
36. D.C.Tex. 1979. Tatro v. State of Tex., 481 F.Supp. 
1224. 
37. D.C.N.Y. 1978. Lora v. Board of Ed. of City of New 
York, 456 F.Supp. 1211. 
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listed twenty-six California cases which mentioned or dealt 
with special education-related services and hospitalization 
as a special education placement (see Table 2). The time 
frame for the California study provided related case law 
from 1967 to 1987. Additional research of California case 
law revealed cases which have parallel issues. 
In the case at hand, Michelle s., the primary issue 
to be resolved was whether Michelle's hospitalization at 
Kings View Hospital constituted a "residential placement" or 
a "related service" which her local school district was 
required to pay for under the EAHCA or whether the placement 
constituted "medical services" excluded from the purview of 
the EAHCA (Clovis Unified School District v. California 
Office of Administrative Hearings 1990, 4811). 
Residential Placement 
The EAHCA indirectly requires school districts to 
provide residential placements by defining elementary and 
secondary schools to include "residential schools" (EAHCA 
1980, sec. 1401 (a) (9-10)). There is no further 
explanation in the EAHCA, but the pertinent regulations 
provide that 
if placement in a public or private residential program 
~s necessary to provide special education and related 
services to a handicapped child, the program, including 
non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost 
to the parents of the child (34 C.F.R., sec. 300.302). 
Table 2. California Case Law Citations from Computerized 
Legal Search (WESTLAW-BASIC) Locator Terms: 
Special Education, Related Services, and 
Hospitalization Placement 
Citations 
1. Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1987. White v. State, 240 Cal.Rptr. 
732. 
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2. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1986. Fisher v. Superior Court (Alpha 
Therapeutic Corp.), 223 Cal.Rptr. 203. 
3. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. Planned Parenthood Affiliates 
of California v. Swoap, 219 Cal.Rptr. 664. 
4. Cal. 1985. State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and 
Housing Com'n (Amon), 217 Cal.Rptr. 16. 
5. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. In re John K., 216 Cal.Rptr. 
557. 
6. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. Davey Tree Surgery Co. v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Bd. (Div. of 
Occupational Safety and Health), 213 Cal.Rptr. 806. 
7. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984. Keech v. Berkeley Unified 
School Dist., 204 Cal.Rptr. 7. 
8. Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1984. Byrnes v. Riles (Capistrano 
Unified School Dist.), 204 Cal.Rptr. 100. 
9. Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1983. Nevada County Office of Educ. 
v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 197 Cal.Rptr. 
152. 
10. Cal.App. 1982. Erzinger v. Regents of University of 
California, 187 Cal.Rptr. 164. 
11. Cal. 1982. Serrano v. Unruh, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754. 
12. Cal. 1982. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment 
and Housing Com'n, 186 Cal.Rptr. 345. 
13. Cal.App. 1982. Erzinger v. Regents of University of 
California, 185 Cal.Rptr. 791. 
14. Cal.App. 1982. Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist. of 
Orange County v. Hubert, 183 Cal.Rptr. 334. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Citations 
15. Cal.App. 1982. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. 
State, 182 Cal.Rptr. 525. 
16. Cal.App. 1981. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. State of Cal. 
Fair Employment Practice Commission, 170 Cal.Rptr. 887. 
17. Cal. 1973. Guerrero v. Carleson, 109 Cal.Rptr. 201. 
18. Cal. 1967. Morris v. Williams, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689. 
19. Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1988. Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal.Rptr. 
837. 
20. Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. In re John K., 216 Cal.Rptr. 
557. 
21. Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1984. Byrnes v. Riles (Capistrano 
Unified School Dist.), 204 Cal.Rptr. 100. 
22. Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1983. Nevada County Office of Educ. 
v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 197 Cal.Rptr. 
152. 
23. Cal.App. 1982. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. 
State, 182 Cal.Rptr. 585. 
24. Cal. 1971. Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601. 
25. Cal. 1966. Manjares v. Newton, 49 Cal.Rptr. 805. 
26. Ca. 1924. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist. of Inyo 
County, 193 Cal. 664. 
Medical Services 
The EAHCA contains no explicit definition of 
"medical services." In the definition of related services 
stated earlier, medical services and counseling are 
included, with the stated exception "that such medical 
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes 
only" (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (17)). Such services are 
supportive services as may be required to assist a 
handicapped child to benefit from special education, and 
include the early identification and assessment of 
handicapped conditions in children. 
The cases that follow are on point regarding the 
issues and/or questions posed by the Clovis Unified case. 
45 
A District of Columbia public school system appealed 
an order to pay for a profoundly schizophrenic child's 
medical expenses during her stay at a private psychiatric 
hospital. The mother had asked for special education 
placement in the private hospital. Treatment involved 
intensive psychotherapy and a drug program. A U.S. district 
court held that the district did not have to subsidize 
medical expenses. The court found the placement was medical 
treatment for her condition and not for rendering educable. 
The placement was treatment (McKenzie v. Jefferson 1983, 
404). 
The parents of a profoundly retarded thirteen-year-
old sought a residential placement as opposed to a six-hour-
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a-day program proposed by a Delaware school district. An 
administrative hearing officer ruled for the district, and 
the parents' appeal was heard by a u.s. district court, 
which was moved by testimony that the child needed 
consistent full-time residential care in order to stop the 
child from experiencing stress and self-destructive 
behavior, including continuous vomiting. The district 
court's ruling of inadequate program was affirmed by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (Kruelle v. New Castle 
County School District 1981, 687). 
The parents of a severely retarded Massachusetts 
child challenged a district on their placement of their 
child in a day school training program; the parents wanted 
day school and a residential placement. The Massachusetts 
Special Education Appeals Board found for the district's 
recommended placement. The board agreed that a residential 
placement was needed but that the child's need for 
residential placement was not educationally founded. The 
u.s. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, disagreed. The court 
concluded that without a residential placement the child not 
only would not make educational progress, but might also 
regress. In this case, the court ruled that if a public or 
private residential placement including nonmedical care and 
room and board was necessary in order to provide educational 
services, such services must be provided at no cost to the 
parents (Abrahamson v. Hershman 1983, 223). 
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In North v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 
a U.S. district court held that where a sixteen-year-old 
multiple handicapped child's problems were so intertwined 
that no single problem could be considered primary, the 
school district of the child's residence was responsible for 
providing a full-time residential educational program for 
him. 
The facts of this case are as follows. The child, 
who was epileptic, emotionally disturbed, and learning 
disabled, was placed in a private residential treatment 
facility in Pennsylvania. Six months later, the facility 
concluded it could no longer deal with the severity of the 
boy's emotional and other problems. The district offered no 
alternative placement. The parents refused twice to accept 
the child back in their home, and he was left at the office 
of the Department of Human Resources, which referred him to 
a public hospital. 
Neglect proceedings were initiated against the 
parents, who then sought an injunction to compel the 
district to place t?e boy in a residential program with 
appropriate psychiatric and other services. The district 
offered an educational day program and left the help for the 
emotional problems to the parents and/or the Department of 
Human Resources. Both the parents and the Department of 
Human Resources disclaimed responsibility. 
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The district court held the district liable for the 
child's residential care expenses for two reasons. First, 
the EAHCA puts primary responsibility for education with the 
state educational agency. Second, the district court would 
not exacerbate the family relationship with the neglect 
proceedings. The district court declined to attempt to 
separate the child's social, emotional, medical, and 
educational problems in order to identify a primary problem 
and affix responsibility to the agency operating in that 
area. Consequently, the use of federal educational laws and 
placement pursuant to those laws was the only legally 
available alternative {North v. District of Columbia Board 
of Education 1979, 136). 
In an Illinois case, parents of a handicapped child 
appealed a "responsible relative" assessment of $100 per 
month for their son's private residence placement. Before 
their appeal could be resolved, their son was given notice 
of discharge and the parents filed suit in the U.S. district 
court. The court held that "if the press of time makes 
exhaustion of administrative remedies impractical, it is not 
required by the EABCA" {Parks v. Pavkovic 1985, 1397). 
Eventually, the appellate court ruled for the parents, 
observing that federal law assures all handicapped children 
the right to a free appropriate public education, and 
further, there is a federal law insistence that all expenses 
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be borne by the state educational agency (Parks v. Pavkovic 
1985, 1397) • 
In a 1983 Illinois case, a u.s. district court ruled 
that state agencies were not required to pay the expenses of 
a child with severe behavioral disorders at a psychiatric 
hospital. The parents brought suit against the Illinois 
State Board of Education to compel it to pay the costs of 
their child's placement at a private residential psychiatric 
facility. The parents argued that the services were 
"psychological services," which are included in the 
definition of related services under the EAHCA. The court 
rejected this argument, saying that the board had properly 
deemed the services psychiatric rather than psychological, 
since they were provided by licensed physicians. Further, 
under the EAHCA, all medical services except those provided 
for evaluative and diagnostic purposes are specifically 
excluded from "related services" (Darlene L. v. Illinois 
State Board of Education 1983, 1348). 
In a related case, a New Jersey U.S. district court 
ruled that a district was required to pay $25,200 for a 
child's stay at a day school that provided individualized 
psychotherapy, family therapy, group therapy, and individual 
and group counseling. The court held that the psychotherapy 
was an integral part of the child's special education 
because the psychological services were performed by social 
workers, school psychologists, nurses, or counselors (T.G. 
v. Board of Education 1983, 420). 
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In 1981, two emotionally disturbed children and 
their parents filed a motion before the u.s. District Court, 
N.D. of California, for a summary judgment against the San 
Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) to compel the 
school district to provide funding for residential placement 
as ordered by a state hearing officer. 
The district had never informed the parents of their 
ERA rights for due process, including the fact that under 
the EAHCA, the district would be responsible for providing 
such funding. The San Francisco Department of Social 
Services (DSS), through juvenile court dependency 
proceedings, had provided residential placement for both 
Christopher T. and his brother, as advised by the SFUSD. 
The district contended that the DSS placements were for 
social and behavioral problems, and not educational. 
The court found that both brothers required 
residential placement in order to benefit from special 
education, based on reports and recommendations of 
psychologists and psychiatrists before the court. The court 
ordered the SFUSD to assume the cost of residential 
placement for both brothers. Further, the court ordered the 
SFUSD to convene new Individual Educational Plans (IEPs) for 
both brothers containing residential placement. The DSS and 
the parents were also to be reimbursed for any costs of care 
for their children incurred by them as a result of the 
SFUSD's failure to pay for their residential placement 
(Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School District 
1982, 1107). 
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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought a summary 
judgment in the U.S. District Court, D. Massachusetts, 
against U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret 
Heckler because the Health Care Financing Administration 
held that certain services provided to persons residing in 
state-owned intermediate care facilities for the mentally 
retarded were not eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid. 
The district court held that the training being 
provided to the individuals came within the category of 
habilitative services for which the state was entitled to 
reimbursement, even though the training was being provided 
by the Commonwealth's Department of Education and Medicaid 
does not reimburse the cost of educational activities. 
The court concluded that the simple skills being 
taught to the institutionalized individuals were not 
educational (academic, i.e., reading, writing, math) in the 
traditional sense of the word. Additionally, this case 
affirmed the use of joint plans of care that included both 
Individual Service Plans (ISPs) and IEPs. ISPs were 
Massachusetts' habilitative training services and IEPs are 
EAHCA provisions to provide special education and related 
services (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Heckler 1985, 687). 
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A parental placement of a deaf child in a private 
school in Ohio in 1986 led the parents to challenge the 
refusal of the state and district to provide free 
transportation to and from the school. The u.s. district 
court made two important decisions in this case. First, if 
transportation is needed for a handicapped child to 
participate in special education, the state is required to 
provide transportation, even though the services are not 
required by the nature of the handicap. Second, the state 
is not required by statute to assume costs of private 
education for a handicapped child or costs of services 
related to that private education, which has been selected 
by the parents for the child for their own personal reasons, 
if the state has fulfilled its obligation by making its own 
free appropriate public education and related services 
available to the handicapped child (James McNair v. 
Cardimone 1987, 1361). 
The Western District of Pennsylvania U.S. District 
Court supported a school district that refused to provide a 
full-time nurse for a multiple handicapped child in order 
for her to attend school. The seven-year-old child suffered 
multiple handicaps, principally Rabinow syndrome (fetal face 
syndrome), severe bronchopulmonary dysplasia, profound 
mental retardation, spastic quadriplegia, seizure disorder, 
and hydrocephalus. She was also legally blind. She 
breathed through a tracheostomy tube and was fed and 
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medicated through a gastrostomy tube. The Pittsburgh School 
District admitted the girl to a special education program 
with the stipulation that the child's parents bear the cost 
of the nursing services and equipment the student needed. 
The cost of such intensive nursing services was about $1,850 
per month; the parents' insurance coverage ceiling was 
$500,000 and was soon threatened with depletion. The 
parents' request that the school district assume the 
expenses of the nurse who was taking care of the student at 
school, and the district's refusal prompted the institution 
of administrative due process that led to the district 
court's decision. 
The court rejected the student's claim that the 
nursing services were not medical, that is, performed by a 
physician. Instead, the court ruled that the nursing 
services required were so varied, intensive, and costly that 
they were more in the nature of medical services than those 
included as related services under the EAHCA (Bevin H. v. 
Wright 1987, 71). 
A Virginia case focused on a parental demand for a 
"self-contained" program for a learning disabled child. The 
county school board was ordered to pay for alternative 
transportation for the child to attend a "self-contained" 
program in a school thirty minutes or more by bus beyond her 
regular school of attendance. This order was considerably 
less than the mother's request to establish a totally new 
"self-contained" classroom at her home school. 
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While the EAHCA intrudes somewhat into the state's 
traditional decision-making role in the education of the 
handicapped, the act was not intended to totally supplant 
the state's prerogative in allocating its financial 
resources. Educational funding is not unlimited. Balancing 
the competing interests of the undeniably important personal 
needs of the handicapped child and the realities of limited 
funding and the necessity of assisting in the education of 
all handicapped children rests as a responsibility with 
administrators in the public schools. A standard of 
reasonable accommodat.ion has been recognized; the standard 
lies somewhere between the best possible education a school 
could provide if it had unlimited funds and access to the 
regular classroom without special assistance (Pinkerton v. 
Moye 1981, 107). 
The Harvard Law Review explained the reimbursement 
calculations for educating a handicapped child and the 
problems created as follows. The states (districts) receive 
a fixed dollar amount for each handicapped student 
irrespective of needs. Localities therefore have an 
incentive to identify handicapped children but not to place 
them in an expensive program. A school system may receive 
no more federal money for a child placed in a $20,000 per 
year residential program than it does for a child who 
requires $200 worth of special reading instruction in the 
regular public school (92 Harv. L.Rev. 1979, 1103, 
1109-1110). 
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After the EAHCA was passed and implemented in 1975, 
the judiciary has heard many cases in the state courts, U.S. 
district courts, and U.S. courts of appeal, as well as at 
the U.S. Supreme Court level. Two of those cases have 
become landmark cases, in that the Supreme Court decisions 
became the basis for clarification and interpretation of the 
intent of Congress in many disputed individual handicapped 
education issues. 
The Board of Education v. Rowley decision has served 
as a primary citation since the Supreme Court announced its 
holdings in 1982. The Supreme Court established the 
following standard for evaluating the appropriateness of a 
handicapped child's education: the child's program must be 
reasonably calculated to allow the child educational 
benefits. The Supreme Court also acknowledged in Rowley 
that the EAHCA was enacted in response to a congressional 
concern that millions of handicapped pupils were being 
denied a public education, thereby denying them admittance 
to public schools or by failure to provide the handicapped 
pupils with specialized instruction and related services 
once they were admitted. The court made it clear that the 
primary purpose of the EAHCA was to provide access to 
education. 
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In this instance, the parents of an eight-year-old 
child, deaf since birth, claimed that the child was entitled 
to have a sign language interpreter in her first-grade 
classroom to enable her to have the same educational 
opportunity as her classmates. The Supreme Court found in 
the record that the child, an excellent lip reader, was 
already provided a special FM electronic hearing aid, that 
the child was remarkably well adjusted with her classmates 
and teacher, and that she was doing average to above average 
academic work. The parents argued that the interpreter was 
needed to allow her to reach her maximum potential, which 
would have been in addition to instruction from a tutor for 
the deaf one hour each day and from a speech therapist for 
three hours each week. When the school district denied 
their request, the parents sought a hearing. The hearing 
officer ruled for the district, as did the New York 
commissioner of education. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the EAHCA, the parents 
sought judicial review in the u.s. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, claiming the school district 
was, in essence, denying a free appropriate public education 
guaranteed by the EAHCA. The district court found that the 
child was doing well, but not learning as much, or 
performing as well academically, as she would without her 
handicap. This disparity between the child's achievement 
and her potential led the court to decide she was not 
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receiving a free appropriate public education. The court 
defined free appropriate as an opportunity to achieve her 
full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to 
other children. The school district's appeal to the u.s. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the u.s. 
district court's ruling. 
The school district made a final appeal to the u.s. 
Supreme Court, which reversed the two lower courts' 
decisions. The Supreme Court held that the EAHCA is 
satisfied when a school provides personalized instruction 
with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped 
child to benefit educationally. The court also stated that 
the IEP should be reasonably calculated to allow the child 
to achieve passing marks and matriculate from grade to 
grade. The court stated that the EHA did not require a 
school to provide a sign language interpreter; it further 
stated that the EHA is not meant to guarantee a certain 
level of education, but merely to open the door of 
educational access to handicapped children by means of 
special education services. The court concluded that the 
EHA is not required to maximize the potential of each 
handicapped child nor provide handicapped children equal 
opportunity commensurate with educational opportunities of 
nonhandicapped children (Board of Education v. Rowley 1982, 
176). 
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Where the Rowley decision produced guidelines to 
provide access to education for many handicapped children, 
the Tatro decision provided four criteria to determine a 
school's obligation to provide services that relate to both 
the health and education of a handicapped child. 
Amber Tatro was a three-and-one-half-year-old child 
with "spina bifida," a birth defect which created orthopedic 
and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder condition 
that prevented her from being able to empty her bladder 
voluntarily. This latter condition required Clean 
Intermittent Catheterization (CIC) to be performed every 
three or four hours each day to prevent chronic kidney 
infection. Because of Amber's young age, she could not 
perform this service for herself. 
The Irving Independent School District in Texas 
decided that were Amber to attend its early childhood 
development program, the school would not provide 
catheterization to Amber during her school day. Amber's IEP 
provided for physical and speech therapy, but failed to 
specify that CIC be administered during the school day as a 
"related service." This decision effectively prohibited 
Amber from attending the early childhood program. 
Amber's parents brought an action before the u.s. 
district court for injunctive relief and monetary damages. 
They sued the State of Texas, the State Board of Education, 
the Texas Education Agency, the board of trustees for the 
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Irving Independent School District, and the district 
superintendent. Their suit alleged that the provision of 
catheterization was required by P.L. 94-142, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. 5701 et seq., and the 
school district's stated policy on treatment of students by 
school personnel. 
The district court upheld the school district and 
ruled that catheterization is a medical, not a related 
service. On the parents' appeal to the u.s. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth District, the decision was reversed. 
The court of appeals held that CIC is a related service 
under the ERA, that the related services qualify as 
"supportive services" required to assist a handicapped child 
to benefit from special education, and that the supportive 
services are no less related to the effort to educate the 
child than are services that enable a child to reach, enter, 
or exit a school. 
In July 1984, the u.s. Supreme Court ruled on the 
Irving Independent School District appeal and affirmed the 
court of appeals' holdings. The Supreme Court stated that 
CIC was a "related service" under the EHA, as without it, 
Amber would not be able to attend school at all (Irving 
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3371). 
The court listed four criteria to determine a 
school's obligation to provide services that relate to both 
the health and education of a child. First, the child must 
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be handicapped so as to require special education; the child 
is then entitled to related services. Second, only those 
services necessary to aid a handicapped child to benefit 
from special education must be provided. Third, ERA 
regulations state that school nursing services must be 
performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not by a 
physician. Fourth, only services can be provided, not the 
equipment required to perform those services. 
Both the Rowley and Tatro decisions and the other 
pertinent cases reviewed in this chapter serve as a 
foundation for the analysis of the findings of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding Clovis 
Unified's claim that Michelle S.'s placement in an acute 
psychiatric care hospital, as a related service, was not 
what Congress intended in the ERA as an appropriate special 
education placement. 
A girl, Katherine D., was in private school in 
Hawaii; she suffered from cystic fibrosis and 
tracheomalacia. Her mother attended to her in the private 
school to provide suctioning and clearing processes. The 
Hawaiian Department of Education certified Katherine D. as 
eligible for special education services. 
The girl's school district proposed a homebound 
program because of the unavailability in the public schools 
of medical services that the girl required. The parents 
rejected the IEP and continued in the private educational 
setting. 
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The following year, the district proposed a public 
school program conducted by staff members the district would 
train to meet the child's medical needs. The parents also 
rejected this proposal, continued private school education, 
and brought suit to compel the district to pay for both 
years of private education. A U.S. district court in Hawaii 
held in favor of the parents, and the school district 
appealed. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that 
the homebound program was inappropriate and, because the 
district was unable to offer an appropriate public school 
program, the district was required to pay the private 
education costs for the first year. However, the 
alternative program conducted by trained district staff 
members was ruled appropriate; thus, the parents were not 
entitled to tuition reimbursement for the second year 
(Katherine D. v. Hawaii Department of Education 1983, 809). 
Parents or guardians of disabled children who 
unilaterally change the placement of their child during any 
review proceedings often seek reimbursement from their 
school district for private school tuition expenses. A 
Massachusetts case ruled upon by the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that parents who violate the "status quo" provisions 
may nevertheless receive private tuition reimbursement from 
the school district if the IEP proposed by the district is 
later found to be inappropriate. However, if the proposed 
IEP is found to be appropriate, the parents will not be 
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in 
unilaterally changing their child's placement. 
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The Supreme Court also observed that to bar 
reimbursement claims under all circumstances of unilateral 
placement would violate the EAHCA, which favors proper 
interim placements for handicapped children. Further, the 
court stated that parents should not be forced neither to 
leave their child in what might be found later to be an 
inappropriate educational placement, nor to obtain an 
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for 
reimbursement. Finally, the court said their decision did 
have an impact on parents, that is, parents who unilaterally 
change placement during the pendency of proceedings do so at 
their own financial risk (Burlington School Committee v. 
Department of Education of Massachusetts 1985, 1996). 
In a 1982 New York case, an emotionally disturbed 
twenty-year-old was educationally placed in a state-approved 
health care facility. When the state decertified the 
institution, giving it a hospital descriptor instead of a 
school descriptor, the twenty-year-old stayed for some time 
after the state declared it was no longer obligated to pay 
the $185 per day cost for the youth's maintenance because 
the institution was now a hospital, not a school. 
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The parents sued for costs until an alternative 
placement could be determined. The district court ruled 
that the state was obligated to continue to pay. Both sides 
used the "status quo" argument, and the state appealed. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the district 
court's decision by ruling that the state could not disclaim 
its statutory obligation by decertifying an institution. A 
free appropriate public education in a suitable institution 
remains the responsibility of the state (Vander Malle v. 
Ambach 1982, 49). 
A 1988 California case illustrated that when 
residential placement is necessary to provide a handicapped 
child with a free appropriate public education, then 
residential placement is a "related service" under the EHA. 
In this instance, a child suffered with mental retardation 
and infantile autism. The Regional Center for the East Bay 
(RCEB), a nonprofit community agency operating under the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, provided services to the 
child by placing him in a licensed community care facility, 
the Behavior Research Institute of California (BRI). A 
local school paid the student's educational costs. 
When the child's self-abusive behavior became 
severe, the RCEB terminated funding and placement at the 
BRI. The parents sought a temporary restraining order and 
then a preliminary injunction to stop the change in 
placement. Since there was no evidence that the placement 
at the BRI was for educational reasons, the u.s. district 
court ruled that the RCEB was not subject to ERA "status 
quo" standards, and the parents' suit was declined. 
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Subsequent reconsideration by the same court vacated 
its previous denial, and the parents prevailed, because the 
IEP team and the RCEB jointly recommended placement at the 
BRI in order to provide the student with a free appropriate 
public education (Corbett v. Regional Center for the East 
Bay 1988, 230). 
An Illinois school district was sued by the parents 
of a high school freshman who had been placed in a special 
education program. The district's Department of Special 
Education recommended outside extensive psychotherapy. An 
IEP that did not include psychotherapy was developed without 
parental participation. The student's condition worsened; 
however, the school district later issued the student a 
diploma. 
The parents' suit sought revocation of the diploma, 
remedial education in a private residential facility, 
reimbursement for costs in providing services to their child 
under his independently prepared IEP, and $1 million in 
general damages for alleged violations of the ERA. The U.S. 
district court ruled against the parents, citing Illinois 
law which required that the state provide tuition-free 
education but did not stipulate that the state was required 
to provide psychotherapy. The court held further that 
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general monetary damages were not available under the ERA. 
The revocation of the diploma was also denied since it made 
no sense to revoke the diploma if the state was not required 
to provide the educational placement the parents sought (Max 
M. v. Thompson 1983, 1330). 
Hospital care has been understood by Congress and 
the secretary of education to be a far more expensive 
proposition than is educational residential placement, and a 
greater burden than the states could ordinarily be expected 
to shoulder in their budgets for education. 
The fact that Congress failed to include 
hospitalization explicitly as a related service or placement 
under the EAHCA is supported by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
its writings in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman: "If 
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of 
federal monies, it must do so unambiguously" (Pennhurst 
State School v. Halderman 1982, 17). 
In a Massachusetts case, a u.s. district court ruled 
that it (the court) was not free to substitute its own 
standards for educational programs for those of the state 
when they held that a school district was not financially 
responsible for placement in a psychiatric hospital, as the 
institution was not a state-approved special education 
facility (Doe v. Anrig 1987, 430). 
In two other cases, the courts ordered school 
districts to pay for residential placements that provided 
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integrated programs of educational and other supportive 
services and fell under the purview of the EAHCA (Clevenger 
v. Oak Ridge School Board 1984, 514; Jefferson County Board 
of Education v. Breen 1988, 853-57). In the Breen case, the 
court expressly refused to place a child in a psychiatric 
hospital. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In 1989, Zirkel found that the spurt of litigation 
in the 1970s, after the implementation of P.L. 94-142, was 
beginning to slow down, with the marked exception of special 
education. He found that a conservative judiciary was 
slowly closing the door on plaintiffs--the students, the 
parents, the staff, and other citizens who sue school 
districts. Additionally, Zirkel pointed out that more than 
55 percent of the U.S. Supreme Court's K-12 education 
decisions during the current decade (the 1980s) had favored 
school authorities, up from only 30 percent during the 
1970s. He stated, "If the '70s were the heyday for people 
suing the schools, then, the '80s are shaping up as the nay-
days--with the exception, that is, of special education" 
(Zirkel 1989, 21). 
In the case study chosen as the focal point of the 
current study--Clovis Unified School District (Plaintiff) v. 
California Office of Administrative Hearings, California 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and California 
Department of Education (Defendants), Michelle S., Real 
Party in Interest--the school district and the child's 
parents appealed a u.s. district court judgment. The appeal 
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was submitted to the u.s. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in San Francisco. The district appealed for a new 
trial and amended findings of fact and conclusion at the 
U.S. district court level. The parents of Michelle S. 
fought the state of California defendants, seeking the 
overturning of the Office of Administrative Hearings' 
rulings and for an extended placement. Further, the parents 
also sought attorney's fees. 
Analysis 
The Clovis Unified School District contended the 
district court's ruling exceeded the requirements of the 
EAHCA by requiring a public education agency to pay for 
medical costs. The district argued, further, that the 
district court ignored pertinent state policies, procedures, 
and laws that the state had developed to ensure a free 
appropriate education for all handicapped pupils within its 
jurisdiction, and that the rulings placed an unwarranted 
obligation on the state or school that Congress could not 
have intended. 
Educational Funding 
The EAHCA of 1975 is an educational funding statute 
enacted pursuant to Congress's spending powers and is 
designed to assist state and local educational agencies in 
regulating education for handicapped children. To qualify 
for federal assistance for special education programs, a 
state must have in effect a policy that assures all 
handicapped children of receiving a "free appropriate 
education." The state must adopt policies and procedures 
that assure all children of receiving an appropriate 
education, regardless of the severity of their handicap. 
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The EAHCA was enacted in response to congressional 
concern that millions of handicapped children were being 
denied a public education, either by denying them admittance 
to public schools or by failure to provide the handicapped 
pupils with specialized instruction and related services 
once they were admitted. 
In the Rowley decision, the u.s. Supreme Court 
explained the act as Congress's providing access or 
availability for all handicapped children. The court 
further explained that Congress did not impose on the states 
any greater substantive educational standard than would be 
necessary to make such access meaningful. In fact, the 
court explained that the process of providing special 
education and related services to handicapped children is 
not guaranteed to produce any particular outcomes. Thus, 
the act was meant more to open the door of public education 
to handicapped children on appropriate terms (related 
services) than to guarantee any particular level of 
education, once they were inside. 
The state of California had the required policy; it 
had a state master plan approved by the secretary of 
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education. The plan contained goals, timetables, and 
service priorities to meet the needs of the unserved and 
inadequately served handicapped pupils. The state plan met 
the numerous procedural requirements of the EAHCA, i.e., 
Individualized Educational Program (IEP) evaluations, parent 
notice and consent, and processes for questioning local 
educational agency decisions through administrative 
hearings. 
Significantly, Congress entrusted the development of 
the IEP to those with substantive knowledge, that is, a 
representative of the local educational agency, the teacher, 
and the parent. The content of the IEP and its 
implementation were left to the discretion of the educators 
and parents within the states. 
If conflicts or disagreements did occur, Congress 
designed a dispute resolution procedure, the first step of 
which was an administrative hearing conducted by an 
independent hearing officer. The hearing officer was not to 
be an employee of the state or local educational agency. 
The hearing officer's decision was to be final unless 
appealed to a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The second step could then include an appeal to a 
court of competent jurisdiction. On appeal, the court is to 
review the administrative record, hear additional evidence 
at the request of a party, and basing its decision on the 
preponderance of evidence, grant such relief as it 
determines appropriate. 
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According to the Supreme Court Rowley rulings, such 
a court's inquiry is twofold. 
First has the state complied with the procedures in the 
EABCA and secondly, is the IEP developed through the 
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive educational benefits. If these requirements are 
met, the state has complied with the obligations implied 
by Congress and the courts can require no more (Board of 
Education v. Rowley 1982, 206-207). 
It can be argued that the administrative hearing 
officer and the U.S. district court failed to recognize the 
state of California's approved plan and the district's 
compliance by making Clovis Unified financially responsible 
for Michelle's placement in a psychiatric hospital. First, 
state law and policy, which do not authorize hospitalization 
as a residential placement, are consistent with the EAHCA, 
which requires only that instruction be provided in 
hospitals. Clovis Unified was already compensating Kings 
Canyon Unified for the educational services being provided 
to Michelle S. while at Kings View Center, an acute care 
psychiatric hospital. 
The district court erred legally in describing the 
hospitalization incumbent services and costs in such a 
residential placement by finding the services as "related 
services" as defined in the EAHCA. By finding that Kings 
View Center provided both related services and residential 
care, the district court ended up ordering the district to 
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pay for medical treatment, not education. In this instance, 
the district had offered a program, Re-Ed West in 
Sacramento, which was a state-recognized educational 
residential school, for approximately $50,000 per year. 
This program authorized by state law was sufficient to 
confer educational benefits on Michelle. 
The contrast was that a 365-day hospital placement 
at Kings View Center was going to cost approximately 
$150,000 per year for medical and pastoral services, not 
education. Table 3 presents the rate and percentage 
distributions per day for Michelle's placement at Kings 
View. 
The Kruelle decision contained the need for 
education in many nonacademic forms, but in general, 
education for the handicapped child should not be stretched 
to cover the medical needs of handicapped pupils. Michelle 
S. had been consistently improving in her special day school 
education prior to her unilateral placement by her parents 
in Kings View. The rationale for the Kings View placement 
was that she was unmanageable at home and periodically at 
school; Michelle was placed at Kings View for medical 
reasons, not educational. To include extended psychiatric 
hospitalization within the related services or special 
education placement options outlined in the EABCA strained 
logic and educational expertise, as well as educational 
resources. Considering Michelle's age at the time of the 
Table 3. Kings View Center, Tioga Ward: Daily Rate and 
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appeal, ten, and considering her prevailing on her appeal 
for continued placement until she reached the special 
education age of majority, twenty-two, the district could 
have been responsible for nearly $2 million for the cost of 
this one child's hospital/educational expenses. 
Related Services 
Related services, by definition, are services that 
have a connection to a child's special educational needs. 
Related services are not defined as services to cure or 
treat a handicapped pupil's disability or illness, but as 
"such services as may be required to assist a handicapped 
child to benefit from special education" (Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (17)). 
Congress was careful in its EAHCA definition to 
specifically exclude "medical and counseling services, 
except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic 
and evaluation purposes only" (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) 
(17)). The totality of the EAHCA was educational in nature 
and in focus. A reading of the entire EABCA makes it clear 
that Congress intended to provide education to handicapped 
pupils, not to solve the social, medical, vocational, 
housing, or transportation problems that are generally 
associated with disabled persons. 
The terms "education" and "instruction" are defined 
and used repeatedly throughout the statute to describe the 
state's responsibilities to handicapped pupils. The term 
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"medical services" is included only once, as mentioned 
above, to exclude all medical services except those which 
are necessary for diagnosis and evaluation. 
The legislative history also speaks of "instruction" 
and "education" and passes over the medical exclusion as 
though Congress's intent needs no further interpretation. 
Both the legislative history and the Rowley decision make it 
clear that in developing the EAHCA, Congress relied heavily 
upon two right-to-education cases for handicapped pupils: 
Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia and 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children CPARCl v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Although children in the PARC 
case were hospitalized, there was no order that schools pay 
for the hospitalization, but simply that the children be 
provided access to special education. Congress expected the 
interpretation of medical services to be relatively 
straightforward, based on the usual understanding of the 
distinction between medical treatment and education. The 
fact that Congress failed to explicitly include 
hospitalization as a service or placement precludes the 
imposition of such a burden by the courts. 
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the 
spending power thus rests on whether the states 
voluntarily and knowingly accept the terms of its 
"contract" with the federal government. Accordingly, if 
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of 
federal monies, it must do so unambiguously (Pennhurst 
State School v. Halderman 1982, 17). 
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Congress had a clear understanding of special 
education and the related services based on the existing 
educational programs being provided by most states in 1974. 
The list of related services provided by Congress in Section 
1401 (a) (12) of the EABCA were services that were already 
being provided in most states. The problem for Congress was 
not designing new and unheard of educational interventions, 
but rather, making the existing programs and services 
available to all handicapped pupils who had such a need. 
The u.s. Supreme Court understood this historical 
context in which Congress operated when it decided the case 
of Irving Independent School District v. Tatro. After 
deciding that intermittent catheterization was a related 
service that required little, if any, specialized medical 
knowledge to administer, the Supreme Court concluded that 
school nurses could perform the catheterization. 
School nurses have long been a part of the educational 
system, and the Secretary would therefore reasonably 
conclude that school nursing services are not the sort 
of burden that Congress intended to exclude as a 
"medical service." By limiting the "medical services" 
exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, 
both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a 
permissible construction to the provision (Irving 
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3378). 
Unlike Tatro, the psychiatric hospitalization of 
Michelle s. was not a long-established part of the 
educational system. The psychological and psychiatric 
services provided by Kings View Center differed with the 
definition of related services found in the EAHCA. Such 
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services are explicitly included within the related services 
and have long been a part of the California educational 
system, i.e., counseling and diagnosing. However, intensive 
extended treatment in a psychiatric hospital has never been 
a part of education in California. The treatment provided 
in such facilities exceeds the expertise of state and local 
educational agencies and clearly falls within the medical 
exclusion addressed in Tatro. 
Residential Placement 
Versus Hospitalization 
Clovis Unified had, in essence, stipulated that a 
residential placement was necessary in the case of Michelle 
S. The district did dispute that a psychiatric hospital was 
a residential placement. The requirement for residential 
placement is imposed by the EAHCA without explanation in 
Section 1401 (a) (9). The legislative history is clear that 
Congress included room and board within the meaning of a 
free appropriate education. California included residential 
placement as an educational expense for handicapped pupils. 
Paying for the costs of a hospital placement for Michelle s. 
was disputed because the district believed that residential 
placement payments arose only when the placement was for the 
purpose of providing education. The federal regulations 
supported this belief: 
If placement in a public or private residential program 
is necessary to provide special education and related 
services to a handicapped child, the program, including 
non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost 
to the parents of the child. C.F.R. comment: This 
requirement applies to placements which are made by 
public agencies for educational purposes (Code of 
Federal Regulations, sec. 300.302). 
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Handicapped children are placed out of home for a 
variety of reasons and upon the recommendation of a variety 
of agencies and professionals. Some are placed in group or 
foster homes, some are institutionalized, and some are 
hospitalized upon the recommendation of medical personnel 
for treatment of mental or physical illness. Others can be 
placed, by IEP teams, in residential schools/facilities 
offering intensive programs, when only those programs will 
enable the handicapped pupil to benefit educationally. It 
is only this latter placement category that Congress 
intended under the EABCA. 
In Abrahamson v. Hirshman (1983), the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated: 
This is not to say that the Act requires a local school 
committee (district) to support a handicapped child in a 
residential program simply to remedy a poor home setting 
or to make up for some other deficit not covered by the 
Act. It is not the responsibility of local officials 
under the Act to finance foster care as such; other 
resources must be looked to. In passing the Act, 
Congress intended to remedy the fact that educational 
systems often failed to provide programs for handicapped 
children • • • Congress did not intend to burden local 
school committees (districts) with providing all social 
services to all handicapped children (227-28). 
Numerous courts have recognized that when faced with 
the question of appropriate residential placement under the 
EABCA, the court is obligated to look at the purpose of such 
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a placement. In Kruelle, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
made the following statement: 
Analysis must focus, then, on whether full time 
placement may be considered for educational purposes, or 
whether the residential placement is a response to 
medical, social or emotional problems that are 
segregable from the learning process. One of the early 
cases actually collapsed the distinction by declaring 
the impossibility of separating emotional and 
educational needs in complex cases. However, as later 
cases demonstrate, the claimed inextricability of 
medical and educational grounds for certain services 
does not signal court abdication from decison making in 
difficult matters (Kruelle v. New Castle County School 
District 1981, 693). 
The cases of Kruelle, North, and Christopher T. 
speak to the segregable issues in Michelle S.'s case. Each 
of these cases proposes that when a child's needs are so 
intertwined as to be inseverable, education cannot be 
relieved of the obligation by pointing to another need. In 
Michelle S.'s case, her needs were so intertwined that 
residential placement was necessary. As to her need for 
psychiatric hospitalization, the issues are distinguishable. 
Once Michelle was identified as needing the services of a 
hospital, her medical needs surmounted her educational needs 
and were therefore severable. In Parks v. Pavkovic, the 
Seventh Circuit District Court contended that whenever a 
severely emotionally disturbed child needs residential 
placement, it is not always for other than educational 
reasons. That court also held that when he/she needs to be 
hospitalized, it is always for medical, not educational 
reasons. 
80 
When Michelle s. was unilaterally placed in Kings 
View, it was for a medical crisis; her needs were clearly 
severable from her educational needs. Because she had an 
acute need for medical intervention, she was unable to be 
placed in a residential school. Her needs for medical 
treatment surmounted her need for an education. Since her 
hospitalization was not for the purpose of education, the 
U.S. district court had erred when it determined that 
hospitalization was a residential placement for which Clovis 
Unified was responsible under the EAHCA. 
There are two cases on point regarding a reviewing 
court's role in determining whether school districts are 
responsible for residential placements in psychiatric 
hospitals. The reviewing court must look at the primary 
purpose of the contested service or placement to determine 
whether it is educational within the meaning of the EAHCA. 
In both Darlene L. and McKenzie v. Jefferson, the court 
reviewed the purpose of hospitalization and concluded that 
Congress did not intend that public education agencies enter 
the field of psychiatric hospitalization by recognizing that 
pupils are not placed in such facilities for educational 
reasons. 
Costs 
When the u.s. district court failed to hear 
testimony on the costs or to consider such costs of the 
hospital placement of Michelle, the court also failed to 
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consider the costs to the states for providing medical 
services as indicators of Congress's intent to exclude such 
services from the EAHCA. 
The u.s. Supreme Court had implicitly noted in Tatro 
that cost could be indicative of congressional intent: 
This definition of "medical services" is a reasonable 
interpretation of Congressional intent. The Secretary 
could reasonably conclude that it was designed to spare 
schools from an obligation to provide a service that 
might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range 
of their competence. By limiting the "medical services" 
exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, 
both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a 
permissible construction to the provision (Irving 
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3371). 
The excluded testimony in the Michelle s. case could 
have demonstrated that the services the district was being 
required to pay for at Kings View Hospital were services of 
a medical nature, provided by persons who traditionally have 
not been employed by the public schools, and for services 
for which educators have neither expertise nor training. It 
was not a simple complaint of high costs for 
hospitalization, but rather, that the high costs were 
indicative that Congress did not intend to place 
hospitalization costs upon the public school system. 
Numerous other courts have recognized that even the 
EAHCA, with its promise of a free appropriate public 
education for all handicapped children, does not require 
excessive spending on one handicapped child at the expense 
of others. The cost differential of $100,000 between the 
two placements found appropriate by the Michelle S. state 
hearing officer should have been heard in the context of 
costs and appropriate placement decisions. The cases of 
Katherine D., Roncker, Stacy G., Darlene L., Age, and 
Takarick all apply. 
Sectarian Status 
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At a trial in the U.S. district court, Clovis 
Unified's motion to amend its pleadings and to offer 
testimony on the issue of Kings View's affiliation with the 
Mennonite Church and subsequent decertification by the state 
of California was denied. The federal regulations governing 
the use of federal grant monies for education, including 
funds generated through the EAHCA, specifically prohibit the 
use of such funds for religious purposes (Code of Federal 
Regulations, sec. 76.352). Additionally, the U.S. 
Constitution frequently has been interpreted as precluding 
the use of federal funds in institutions that are 
pervasively sectarian, where excessive entanglement of 
church and state might occur. There exist numerous case law 
references that may have had a bearing on Clovis Unified's 
case. 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this 
study relates to the time it takes to implement the due 
process procedures provided by the EAHCA. In July 1985, the 
parents of Michelle S. notified Clovis Unified that they 
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wanted the district to pay for Michelle's residential 
placement costs in Kings View Hospital. The course of 
administrative hearings led to an order from the hearing 
officer that Michelle was to be placed at Kings View for the 
1985-86 school year. 
In September 1985, the district filed for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California denied both motions and set a trial date for 
October 1985. That date was postponed until March 1986. 
The trial was eventually held, and in June-July 1986, the 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law were entered into 
the record, as was a judgment for Michelle. 
Clovis Unified then filed an appeal with the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was submitted and 
argued originally in August 1987. The submission was 
vacated by the appeals court in April 1988, while the 
district, the state superintendent of instruction, and the 
State Department of Education prepared a joint appeal. The 
appeal was resubmitted in March 1990, with a final ruling 
filed in May 1990. The exhaustion of all due process 
procedures for both the district and Michelle's parents took 
nearly five years to resolve. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn is that 
pursuit of resolution of difficult issues involving 
handicapped children's educational placement and related 
services by means of legal counsel and the judicial system 
is a very costly venture. In the case of Clovis Unified, 
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the retention of counsel throughout the administrative 
hearings and throughout the trial in the u.s. district court 
resulted in legal fees that easily exceeded $200,000. 
Coupled with this conclusion is that Michelle s.•s 
parents cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the payment by the district of their attorney's fees 
pursuant to the u.s. district court's order of December 8, 
1986. It must be noted that when the issue first went to 
trial in October 1985, attorney's fees were not provided for 
by the EAHCA. With the passage of the Handicapped 
Children's Protection Act (HCPA) of 1986, Congress expressly 
provided that attorney's fees that were pending on or after 
July 4, 1984 be paid to a prevailing parent or guardian. 
As stated under the limitations of this study, 
conclusions can be made regarding the questions put forward 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The tribunal 
provided the following legal conclusions. 
School districts need not fund hospitalization for 
such children as Michelle S. The court of appeals explained 
as follows: 
It stands to reason that the high cost of her placement 
is due to the status of Kings View as a medical 
facility, requiring a staff of licensed physicians, a 
high staff to patient ratio, and other services which 
would not be available or required at a placement in an 
educational institution. While the cost of medical and 
hospital services are not dispositive, the Supreme Court 
in Tatro noted that the Secretary of Education, in 
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promulgating regulations, excluded "the services of 
physician or hospital," partly because such services are 
"far more expensive" than the services, for example, of 
a school nurse. Clearly hospital care is, and was 
understood by Congress and the Secretary of Education to 
be, a far more expensive proposition than is educational 
residential placement and a greater burden than the 
states could ordinarily be expected to shoulder in their 
budgets for education. We, too, recognize the 
unfairness of requiring school districts to pay for 
hospitalization on the basis of broad interpretations of 
ambiguous language in funding statutes such as the EAHCA 
(Clovis Unified School District--Appellant v. California 
Office of Administrative Hearings, Michelle S., Real 
Party in Interest--Appellee 1990, 4811). 
With this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the u.s. district court's and the 
administrative hearing officer's order that Clovis Unified 
had to pay for the hospitalization of Michelle S. during the 
1985-86 school year. The court also in effect denied 
Michelle S.'s appeal for attorney's fees because the reverse 
order indicated that the family was not a prevailing party 
and therefore not entitled to attorney's fees under the 
EAHCA, sec. 1415 (e) (4). 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the California 
Master Plan for Special Education by indicating that an 
appropriate special education delivery system and acceptable 
standards for educating handicapped children in nonpublic 
residential facilities does exist. 
Recommendations 
As the issues of appropriate educational residential 
placements and the medical services exclusion under the 
EAHCA were analyzed and resolved in the Michelle S. case, 
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another layer of clarity about Congress's intent in putting 
the act into being has come into the voluminous body of case 
law regarding the implementation of the act. However, the 
factor of time to effect due process, the factor of costs in 
carrying out due process, and the factor of ever-increasing 
special education demands on public school financial 
resources continue to exist and, in fact, increase. 
A theme that recurred consistently in the research 
of the legal literature was that a badly needed piece of 
national legislation, the EAHCA, possibly needs to be 
reexamined, especially in view of the ever-increasing 
litigation being experienced in implementing the EAHCA. The 
same is true of the state's debate over how best to allocate 
its financial resources in order to accommodate all 
handicapped children. 
While the EAHCA intrudes somewhat into the state's 
traditional decision-making role in the education of the 
handicapped, the act was not intended to totally supplant 
the state's prerogative in allocating its financial 
resources. Educational funding is not unlimited. Competing 
interests must be balanced to reach a reasonable 
accommodation. On the one hand are the important personal 
needs of the individual handicapped child, and on the other, 
the realities of limited funding and the necessity of 
assisting in the education of all handicapped children. 
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Paul Goldfinger, in his article, "Special Education: 
Too Many Mandates, Too Little Funding--A Formula for 
Disaster," goes a bit further, in stating that the balance 
also effects the nonhandicapped child: 
Something is out of balance • • • what was initially 
hailed as a major step for the equal protection of 
students with disabilities is now seen by many as giving 
over-protection to this one class of students 
(Goldfinger 1995, 5). 
Goldfinger points out that under the EAHCA (IDEA), a 
guarantee of a free appropriate education gives special 
education first call on a school agency's revenues. This 
guarantee in combination with some special education abuses 
is causing conflicts with general education. Such conflicts 
are depicted as special education costs which ultimately 
come from revenues meant for other students, an encroachment 
on a district's general funds. 
The bottom line, according to Goldfinger, is that 
special education students have rights and privileges beyond 
those available to general education pupils. It is 
appropriate that all students receive the services they need 
to benefit from their education. However, due to limited 
financial resources and the ability of one segment of the 
school population to have first call on those resources 
means that the balance of the school population is not 
equally served. 
One of the balances potentially forthcoming, but not 
recommended, is a series of reverse discrimination suits 
originating from the violation of rights of nondisabled 
pupils. This could be the next litigation explosion; and 
one that proponents of the EAHCA and proponents for a 
guaranteed FAPE for nondisabled students should avoid. 
Other directions that are recommended for future 
research, review, and/or reform are as follows: 
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1. California's hearing officer system needs to be 
examined critically to ensure that hearing officers have 
appropriate standards for comparison of assessments of a 
pupil's need by parents and nonpublic school advocates, and 
assessments performed by local education agencies. These 
standards, assessment comparisons, and the hearing officers 
who implement them need to be more fair. 
2. California should use new federal funds as an 
augmentation for special education, instead of reducing 
state support for special education. By doing so, the 
federal government would receive a benefit for providing a 
higher level of funding for special education. Further, 
such a move would provide incentive for California special 
education advocates to seek a higher level of federal 
funding. 
3. California needs to fully fund growth in special 
education. In 1994-95, only 49 percent of the statutory 
entitlement for special education was funded. This means 
that only about half of the growth of pupils enrolled in 
special education was funded. 
4. California and the federal government need to 
establish a standard that special education pupils are 
guaranteed in their FAPE that is comparable to that for 
general education pupils. 
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5. California and the federal government need to 
clarify the local education agency placement requirements 
related to the "least restrictive environment," especially 
when dealing with the new emphasis on "total inclusion" and 
placement in nonpublic, nonsectarian schools. 
6. California and the federal government need to 
restrict attorney's fees, so that the cost of such fees do 
not override sound educational decisions. Two ways this 
could be implemented are (1) prohibit the payment of fees 
for any attorney involvement in the development of 
individualized education program (IEP), which would make 
this process more nonadversarial, and (2) provide attorney's 
fees only proportionate to the percentage of issues on which 
the attorney prevailed. 
7. The California and federal governments need to 
fulfill their promises when the EAHCA was enacted that a 40 
percent funding level be maintained, or the state and 
federal mandates are to be reduced. 
8. The California and federal governments need to 
require that noneducational services be provided by 
noneducational agencies. Specifically, local health 
agencies should be required to provide occupational and 
physical therapy and other health services. Mental health 
agencies should provide mental health services under the 




PROPOSED SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 
DELIVERY SYSTEM 
Introduction 
The case study detailed in Chapters I through IV 
leads to· a call for educational leadership to develop better 
implementation provisions of Public Law 94-142. The strict 
adherence to the definitions and procedures contained in the 
federal law in conjunction with the expansive California 
Special Education Master Plan and enormous body of judicial 
decisions on special education has led to a loss of trust 
for educators, in general, which disturbingly includes a 
growing mistrust of Special Education Local Plan Area 
(SELPA) personnel, extending even to the special education 
classroom instructors. This loss of trust and resultant 
adversarial role of educators with their clients, special 
education students, and the students' parents needs to be 
reversed. 
Such a reversal needs to lead to new attitudes and 
roles for school site administrators, district SELPA 
administrators, and all classroom instructors, regular and 
special education. The purpose of this chapter, then, ~s to 
propose a special education services delivery system that 
will reestablish the role of school site administrators, 
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district office personnel, and all classroom teachers as 
client supporters and advocates not only for special 




Educators, in general, have lost their focus and, 
thereby, their purpose in providing aggressive leadership 
and equitable access to education for handicapped children. 
A social philosophy underlying the delivery of special 
education services needs to be rearticulated. The founding 
documents of the nation stress the proposition that all men 
are created equal. Time and time again, this statement has 
been interpreted to mean that all men are equally human. 
All other rights are derived from this humanness, including 
the right of access to education. This right is not 
dependent on a level of intelligence, a degree of physical 
perfection, or a standard of emotional stability. 
Therefore, each child has a right of access to education 
regardless of level of intelligence or physical or emotional 
disabilities. Various courts and educational institutions 
have acted over the years to define and redefine what is 
reasonable in providing this access. Certainly in the cited 
case in this study and in many other cases, consideration of 
the fiscal impact of providing this equal access to 
education is allowed; however, the philosophy behind Public 
Law 94-142 needs to be reasserted. Congress, representing 
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society, looks to the leaders of schools to seek out, 
identify, and guarantee a free, appropriate public education 
to every handicapped child under a clearly defined system of 
due process. This is, then, the articulated philosophy and 
the focused role of educators in the proposed special 
education delivery system that follows. 
Goal Sharing 
Clovis Unified School District has initiated a new 
interactive leadership system called Goal Sharing. One of 
the foundational premises of Goal Sharing addresses the need 
to reestablish trust between educators and the clients they 
serve. 
For too long, educators have told their clients, the 
district's parents and taxpayers, what an education is. For 
too long, educators have devised education's policies, 
practices, and procedures without the input of their 
clients. Educators have decided both the .. what .. and "how .. 
of education, with little, if any, input from their client 
constituency. When the definition of education or the 
processes of education have been questioned, for too long, 
educators have responded defensively or adversarially with 
their clients. Goal Sharing provides a proactive, 
collaborative inclusion of all clients in the district's 
educational decision-making process. The Goal Sharing model 
currently consists of seven advisory councils, whose 
membership is a broad-based collection of students, parents, 
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clergy, chamber of commerce representatives, business 
leaders, educational leaders, teachers, civic leaders, 
employees of the district, and members of the governing 
board. Each council's primary purpose is to survey and poll 
all the district's clients as to what the attributes of a 
quality education are. The councils also review district 
policies, practices, and procedures in order to recommend to 
the governing board and administration, systemic changes and 
improvements. The educational products and services desired 
by the clients of the district will hopefully improve 
through this community collaborative effort. The councils 
are formed to focus on the functions suggested by their 
respective titles, i.e., the Accountability, Student 
Standards/Community Support, Administrative Services, 
Cognitive Domain--Mind, Psychomotor Domain--Body, Affective 
Domain--Spirit, and Communications Councils. 
Goal Sharing: Special Education 
Advisory Council 
The proposed special education delivery model starts 
by creating an additional district council in the Goal 
Sharing paradigm: 
The Special Education Council shall consist of at 
least the following: a representative from the district's 
child development program (preschool age), a parent from the 
child development program, a special education parent from 
each educational level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a special education 
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teacher from each educational level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), the 
district SELPA administrator, a district psychologist, a 
regular education teacher from each educational level (K-6, 
7-8, 9-12), a regular education parent from each educational 
level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a principal from each educational 
level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a clergyman, a local university 
representative, a civic leader, a business person, a member 
of the judiciary, a member of the bar, representatives from 
various special education advocacy groups, general 
representatives from the community at large, and 
representatives from the medical professions (doctors and/or 
nurses). 
Goals: Goal Sharing Special 
Education Council 
The goal for the Special Education Council is to 
proactively and collaboratively include the district's 
clients in determining what quality special education 
programs are and to provide client input into how to effect 
equitable access to education for all handicapped children. 
The processes that have been most successful for the 
implementation of the Goal Sharing model are described below 
as process objectives. 
I. Determine what special education is currently (staff, 
services, funding, facilities, history, law). 
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II. Inform all clients (all parents, regular and special 
education; all staff, regular and special education; 
the total community) about current services. 
III. Poll all clients as to what special education should 
be in the district. 
IV. Prioritize input and establish short-term goals (one 
year) and long-term goals (three to five years). 
v. Recommend policies, practices, and procedures which 
will achieve both short-term and long-term goals to 
the governing board. 
A secondary goal for the Special Education Advisory 
Council is to communicate the role of the advisory council 
to the special education clients of the district. This 
communication should serve as the impetus for providing a 
community-wide knowledge base of the special education 
services available, the identification and early 
intervention processes available, and finally, a supportive 
resource/advocacy group for all handicapped children in the 
district. 
Outline of Special Education Advisory 
Council Orientation for Preschool 
Parents, All Existing District 
Parents and Employees, and 
the Community at Large 
I. Handicapped Education before 1975 
A. Institutionalization 
B. Exclusionary Doctrine 
C. Special classes 
D. Categorical services 
E. Normalization or least restrictive environment 
F. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1966 
G. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
H. PARC (1971) 
I. Mills (1972) 
J. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, sec. 504 
II. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975; EAHCA; P.L. 94-142 
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A. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 34, parts 300 
and 104. 
B. Purpose: (20 u.s.c. 1400 et seq.) 
c. Definitions in EAHCA 
1. FAPE (20 u.s.c. sec. 1401 (a) (18)) 
2. Handicapped children (20 u.s.c. sec. 1401 (a) 
( 1) 
3. Learning disabilities (20 u.s.c. sec. 1401 
(a) (15) 
4. Special education (20 u.s.c. sec 1401 (a) 
(16) 
5. Related services (20 u.s.c. sec. 1401 ( 0) 
(17) 
D. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 
1986; P.L. 99-392; :Attorney's Fee Bill," (20 
U.S. C. sec. 1415 (e) ( 4) and (f) 
E. The Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(IDEA) 
III. California Handicapped Education History 
A. Special schools and classes 
B. Increased categories of service 
C. Day classes 
D. Residential schools 
E. Mandatory programs 
F. California Education Code, part 30 (1980) 
IV. Case Law 
A. Federal 
1. U.S. District Courts (F.Supp.) (Trial) 
2. U.S. Courts of Appeal (F.2d) (Appeals) 
a. Eleven Circuits 
b. D.C. Circuit 
c. Federal Circuit 
3. U.S. Supreme Court 
B. State 
1. Superior Court (Trial) 
2. California Courts of Appeal (Districts) 
(Appeal) 
3. California State Supreme Court 
c. State Agency Administrative Hearings 
1. Education of Handicapped Law Review 
(E.H.L.R.) 
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V. Clovis Unified School District as Special Education 
Local Plan Area (SELPA) 
A. Policies 
1. CUSD Policy 2109, sec. 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act (1973) 
2. CUSD Policy 3306, Least Restrictive 
Environment 
3. CUSD Policy 3307, Independent Education 
Evaluations 
4. CUSD Policy 3308, Exceptional Children 
a. CUSD Administrative Regulation 3308 
B. Practices 
1. Referrals: parental consent 
2. Assessment by trained specialists 
3. Development of Individualized Education 
Program (IEP) 
4. Certification/decertification of learning 
disability 
5. Home school placement 
6. Mainstreaming 
7. Resource Specialist Program 
8. Special Day Class Program 
C. Procedures for Dispute Resolution 
1. Rights 
2. Due Process 
a. Premediation conferences 
b. Mediation conference 
c. Fair hearings 
d. Trial Courts 
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e. Courts of Appeal 
f. Supreme Courts 
3. Requests for Fair Hearings 
a. Institute for Administrative Justice, 
McGeorge School of Law 
b. Advocacy Assistance, Protection and 
Advocacy, Inc. 
VI. Proactive Preparation for Future Issues 
A. Discipline of handicapped students 
B. Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) 
C. Total Inclusion: Teacher training 
D. Section 504 disabilities 
Learning Activities for/by the Special 
Education Advisory Board 
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The Special Education Advisory Council would have to 
conduct a series of seminars regarding the current status of 
special education in the district, state, and nation. 
At the first seminar, one goal would be to explain 
the desired changing of current perceived roles of school 
personnel used now in the implementation of special 
education and related services. There is an excellent 
seventy-five-minute film entitled The Face of Inclusion: A 
Parent's Perspective. The film is available from LRP 
Publications in Pennsylvania. 
The film provides a unique and moving parent's 
perspective of inclusion for administrators, teachers, and 
parents of children with disabilities. Joe and Ro Vargo are 
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the parents of three daughters, the oldest of whom has Rett 
Syndrome. 
The Vargos are experienced advocates for inclusive 
education and have been involved in systemic educational 
reform for years. They share their family philosophy, their 
early decision to enroll their daughter in an inclusive 
program, the risks and benefits, and the support systems 
necessary to be successful. Their stories of inclusion have 
forever changed their lives for the better. 
A second seminar should be focused on the evolving 
status of special education in the nation, state, and Clovis 
Unified School District. The history of PL 94-142 and its 
implementation in California should be presented and 
concluded with a description of the current status of 
special education and related services in the Clovis Unified 
School District. This is especially important because the 
district SELPA has just reorganized its special education 
services delivery model. Essentially, the model was 
presented as a voluntary reclassification of approximately 
five hundred Special Day Class (SDC) students to the more 
inclusive Resource Specialist Program (RSP). The rationale 
for this delivery system modification was that more state 
financial revenue would be generated and more RSP teachers 
would become available for special education student 
consultation. Additionally, the new consultative RSP 
personnel would be able to provide more training and support 
to the regular education teaching staff, who would be 
instructing many more RSP students in their new and much 
more inclusive regular education classes. 
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A third foundational seminar would be an in-depth 
look at national, state, and district special education 
revenues and expenditures. With an understanding of the 
financial status of the SELPA in combination with a 
knowledge of the law and its incumbent due processes, the 
Special Education Advisory Council could be used for input 
on new or revised board policies, practices, and procedures 
that could be formulated to provide more collaborative, 
collegial administrative, faculty, and parent input in 
achieving a positive advocacy for achieving equal access to 
a free and appropriate education for handicapped children. 
A final foundational seminar would provide a review 
of current literature on implementing an inclusive method of 
special education for handicapped children. A SELPA library 
of texts and videos should be created for the use of the new 
partners in the Goal Sharing. The following listing would 




Inclusive Education Programs 
A monthly newsletter dedicated to the legal and 
practical issues in educating children with disabilities 
in regular education environments. $135.00 
California Special Education Alert 
A monthly newsletter dedicated to providing the latest 
legal decisions and methodologies for successful special 
education programs in California. $235.00 
The Face of Inclusion: A 
Parent's Perspective 
Videos 
Illustrates the Joe and Ro Vargo parental experience 
with inclusionary education for their daughter who has 
Rett Syndrome. 75 mins. $109.00 
ADHD: Inclusive Instruction 
and Collaborative Practices 
Teaches what Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is 
and provides a review of successful and proven team and 
classroom approaches. 38 mins. $104.00 
The Seven Deadly Sins: Common Mistakes 
that Lead to Due Process Hearings 
Melinda Maloney, special education attorney, reveals 
seven common mistakes that lead to due process hearings. 
Case studies are reviewed, and legally based advice is 
given to handle such cases. 20 mins. $79.00 
How to Discipline Students with Disabilities 
Effectively and Legally 
Special education students may be disciplined: suspended 
and expelled if the conduct is not caused by a 
disability. This video illustrates how to comply with 
the procedures to protect civil rights and how to 
provide alternative educational placements. 20 mins. 
$79.00 
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Inclusion: Heaven or Hell? 
Reviews of inclusion, mainstreaming, least restrictive 
environment, and the regular education initiative should 
provide guidance for districts to advocate compliance. 
20 mins. $79.00 
Special Education for Regular Teachers 
An in-house training for principals, superintendents, 
board members, and other regular education 
professionals. Video provides tips for compliance 
without breaking budget. 20 mins. $79.00 
Public Law 94-142: An Overview 26 mins. $170.00 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 28 mins. $170.00 
Discipline 17 mins. $170.00 
Extended School Year Services 17 mins. $170.00 
Least Restrictive Environment 20 mins. $170.00 
Procedural Due Process 20 mins. $170.00 
Attorney's Fees 20 mins. $170.00 
Residential Placement 15 mins. $170.00 
Serving Medically Fragile Students 20 mins. $170.00 
New IDEA Amendments 20 mins. $170.00 
Books 
Least Restrictive Environment: Paradox of Inclusion, by 
Lawrence M. Siegel, Esq. $32.00 
Discipline in the Schools, by Eric Hartwig, PhD, and Gary 
Rusch,Esq. $31.00 
Section 504, the ADA, and the Schools, by Perry A. Zirkel, 
PhD, and Jeanne M. Kincaid, Esq. $82.00 
The Continuing Evolution of Special Education Law, 1978-
1995, by Melinda Maloney, Esq., and Brian Shenker. 
$28.50 
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Establishing such an essential library would cost 
nearly $3,000; however, such a financial outlay would be an 
excellent first step in answering the call stated at the 
beginning of this chapter to reaffirm the original 
philosophical foundations of Public Law 94-142 to 
reestablish the trust of educational clients: parents and 
students, classroom teachers, and special education 
administrators. 
Shared knowledge by both school officials and 
clients applied pursuant to a collegial advocacy 
partnership, i.e., Goal Sharing, has had and can continue to 
have a major role in accomplishing equal access to education 
for all students, especially those who have disabilities. 
In reality, such concepts must be successful or further 
growth of the adversarial relationship will continue to 
grow, and the competition for the already scarce financial 
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